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I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple states are often interested in regulating the same conduct. A
state's private international law limits the reach of its regulatory efforts in the
face of this Fact of Overlap. Private international law traditionally includes
jurisdiction, choice of law, and the enforcement of judgments. The law of en-
forcement of judgments is one part of the law governing a state's response to
foreign exercises of sovereignty. One response is to refuse enforcement of for-
eign judgments. But other responses include sanctioning parties who obtain•2
such judgments; making enforcement of such judgments domestically action-
"[T]hree consecutive phases ... comprise the process of judicial resolution of most multi-
state disputes, namely: (1) jurisdiction; (2) choice of law; and (3) recognition and enforcement of
judgments." SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY C. PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, CONFLICT
OF LAWS: AMERCAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 3 (1998).
2 Anti-suit injunctions enjoin suit in foreign courts and are backed by the contempt of court
apparatus used to enforce injunctions generally. Anti-anti-suit injunctions enjoin the pursuit of
foreign anti-suit injunctions. See generally Daniel Tan, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing
Problem of Comity, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. - (forthcoming March 2005); Michael D. Schimek, Com-
ment, Anti-Suit and Anti-Anti-Suit Injunctions: A Proposed Texas Approach, 45 BAYLOR L. REV.
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able;3 and imposing diplomatic, economic, or military sanctions on states ren-
dering such judgments.
4
This Article offers a normative theory of private international law. Such
theories are sufficiently many that a preliminary attempt at classification is
worthwhile. Part II identifies three categories into which the extant theories fall,
and demonstrates the usefulness of this categorization by applying it to theories
of conflicts of law. Briefly, naturalist theories bound state law according to an
evident or higher-law notion of sovereignty; nationalist theories bound state law
only so much as state interest demands; and internationalist theories bound state
law out of respect for the moral-philosophical claims to legitimacy of foreign
states. Naturalism has the ring of nineteenth-century, doctrinal private law; na-
tionalism, the ring of private law post law-and-economics; and internationalism,
the ring of constitutional law or political philosophy. In conflicts of law, early
twentieth-century territorialism, 5 American interest analysis, 6 academic state-
3 Claw-back statutes make foreign enforcement of some part of a foreign judgment, for ex-
ample a punitive damages award, itself domestically actionable. See, e.g., Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6 (Eng.) (authorizing suits to recover noncompensatory damages);
Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1137 (D. D.C. 1983); U.S. v.
Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
4 Including responses to foreign regulatory efforts best considered executive or legislative
rather than judicial blurs the boundary between private and public international law. Nevertheless,
their inclusion is natural if one accepts that private international law's role is to deal with the Fact
of Overlap. Calling nationalism a theory of private international law creates a risk of bias in its
favor, however, because nationalism and naturalism views have more intuitive appeal in private
law, whereas internationalism has more intuitive appeal in public law.
5 See 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1 (1935); see also
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934); RALEIGH C. MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-7 (1901);
A. V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d
ed. 1908).
6 See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHt. L. REv. 9, 9-14 (1958) [hereinafter The Constitution and the
Choice of Law]; Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 8
DuKE L. J. 171, 177-81 (1959) [hereinafter Methods and Objectives]; Brainerd Currie, The Verdict
of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. CHI. L. RV. 258 (1961) [hereinafter
The Verdict of Quiescent Years]; Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 756-64 (1963) (often cited as moderating Currie's view, although I think it
merely clarifies what his view had always been); see also Brainerd Currie, Married Women's
Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227, 151-63 (1958) [hereinaf-
ter Married Women's Contract]; Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Auto-
mation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958) [hereinafter Survival of Actions];
Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964, 1019
(1958) [hereinafter Displacement of the Law]; Brainerd Currie & Herma H. Schreter, Unconstitu-
tional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L. J. 1323,
1323-25 (1960) [hereinafter Privileges and Immunities] (discussing constitutional objections to
interest analysis); Brainerd Currie & Herma H. Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the
Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1960) [hereinafter Equal Protec-
tion] (discussing constitutional objections to interest analysis); Brainerd Currie, The Silver Oar
and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1959) [hereinafter Romero
2005]
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subject connection theories,7 and the modem doctrine of deference to foreign
judicial processes within the European Union 8 all are subject to this classifica-
tion. Conflicts theory in the United States has progressed over the past century
from naturalism to internationalism and, in the past decade, toward nationalism.
Nevertheless, nationalism remains unpopular, is as yet without a sustained de-
fense, and, consequently, provokes little response from defenders of alternative
theories.
Part III states and defends nationalism. The exercise of power pursuant
to law is justified by the political processes from which law emerges. The par-
ticular rules that constitute justified law are those that furthest advance the ends
that emerge from these political processes-the ends justifying a state's law.
Nationalism holds that private international law, like the rest of a state's law,
should maximize the attainment of these ends. Because the authority of legal
decision-makers stems from their status as officials of a state, their institutional
warrant to exercise state power allows them to give effect only to ends that
emerge from that state's political processes. A legal decision-maker who gives
effect to other ends undermines the justification for his exercise of power-the
justification for law-that the political processes in place provide. He exhibits,
in short, infidelity to law.
Nationalist legal decision-makers nevertheless legitimately limit the
reach of domestic law because, in the presence of the Fact of Overlap, some
applications of domestic law interfere with other states' regulatory interests and
would cause them to sanction the regulating state. Part III.B describes three
ways in which applications of a state's law can interfere with other states' regu-• 9
latory interests, imposing externalities ofsovereignty. Part III.C describes three
Case]; Brainerd Currie & Mark H. Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines: A
Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 9 DUKE L. J. 1, 8-9 (1960); Brainerd Currie, Justice Traynor
and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1961) [hereinafter Justice Traynor]; Brainerd
Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 12 DUKE L. J. 1 (1963) (discussing the consti-
tutional challenges); Brainerd Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry into the
"Rule of Validation," 18 OKLA. L. REv. 243, 243-44 (1965) [hereinafter Ehrenzweig and the
Statute of Frauds].
7 See, e.g., LEA" BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5 (1991); Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional
Due Process and Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293, 293-95 (1987); Lea Brilmayer, Inter-
stale Federalism, 1987 BYU L. REV. 949, 968-73 (1987); Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and
Choice of Law, 98 YALE L. J. 1277, 1292-95, 1297-98 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Com-
munity, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L. J. 1, 2-3 (1991); cf Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "'Vested-
ness, " and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1191 (1987) (discussing an alternative internationalist
theory).
8 See Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role ofthe International Law
of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 373, 376 n. 12 (1995) (describ-
ing Brussels and Lugano conventions).
9 Similar terminology has been used by others. See, e.g., William Blumenthal, The Challenge
of Sovereignty and the Mechanisms of Convergence, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 267, 267 (2004) ("As
international markets confront the jurisdictional reach of national competition authorities, the
exercise of sovereign powers spills across national borders .... Unless national authorities are
[Vol. 107
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ways in which states can influence other states' regulatory behavior. States can
deter (encourage) regulation that creates externalities of sovereignty by impos-
ing positive (negative) costs of sovereignty. An important consequence of na-
tionalism is that a private international law uniform across states that differ in
their ability to absorb and inflict costs of sovereignty requires legal decision-
makers of at least some of these states to exhibit infidelity to law-at least, to
their law.
10
Part IV applies nationalism. A state's private international law deter-
mines whether it will regulate conduct that other states are simultaneously inter-
ested in regulating. States should do so when the benefits of regulation out-
weigh the costs other states can impose to deter such regulation discounted by
the probability of their imposition. Both costs and benefits should be measured
in terms of attainment of the ends justifying a state's law. Part III takes two of
the traditional dimensions of private international law-jurisdiction and choice
of law-and identifies four paradigm positions that a nationalist state might
take. For each such position, it identifies considerations that would rightly
move states to take that position and offers examples of similar positions actu-
ally taken by states in specific subject areas.
Part V answers objections. Part VI discusses extensions and connec-
tions to the work of others, including important connections to the agency-cost
analysis of corporate law and the theory of the firm. It also discusses positive
claims; the notions of sticky, camouflaged, and private sovereignty; and a na-
tionalist theory for federal organizations resolving regulatory conflicts between
subsidiary states. Part VII summarizes the foregoing, infers from it several pre-
scriptions for legal decision-makers, and identifies consequences for further
work in private international law.
II. NATURALISM, NATIONALISM, AND INTERNATIONALISM: THREE THEORIES
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Naturalist theories hold that states should set private international law so
that their claims to regulatory authority do not exceed limits specified by a nor-
mative source other than the state itself. This higher normative source defines
sovereignty-legitimate claims to regulatory authority are those consistent with
prepared to suffer the externality problem or to surrender sovereignty over their own affairs, they
must find mechanisms to coordinate."); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1199, 1211-12 (1998) ("No matter which law governed ... the application of that law would
have produced spillover effects ... in other jurisdictions .... In these situations and countless
others, one jurisdiction regulates extraterritorial conduct in a way that invariably affects individual
behavior and regulatory efforts in other jurisdictions. These spillover effects constitute the central
problem of modern conflict of laws.").
10 Professors Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks observe "extensive decoupling between shared
purposes and structure on the one hand, and disparate functional demands and results on the other
.... [S]tructure is not determined by function." Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Insti-
tutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1749, 1759 (2003) (emphasis added).
20051
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its edicts. The vested-rights theory of Joseph Beale, I I dominant in the early
twentieth century, embodied in the first Restatement, 12 and still followed in a
minority of states,13 is a naturalist theory. Naturalist theories offer a formalist or
legal-metaphysical justification for assignments of regulatory authority. "It is in
the nature of torts that they are subject to regulation by the law of the place of
injury., 14 Objecting to this "devout and orthodox commitment to a fundamen-
talist theology of territorialism and vested rights"15 and seeking a functional
basis for private international law, the legal realists 16 developed interest analy-
sis.
Interest analysis assigns regulatory authority to the forum so long as the
policies underlying its substantive laws would be advanced by their application
to the conduct in question.' 7 Interest analysis eschews consideration of foreign
responses to domestic exercises of regulatory authority. 18 This makes interest
1 See BEALE, supra note 5; see also A. V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH
REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1908); MINOR, supra note 5; RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). Beale's theory assigns regulatory authority to states based on the
geographic location of a critical element determined by the type of the cause of action. For exam-
ple, in tort cases, the theory assigns regulatory authority to the state in which the injury occurred.
12 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
13 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000: As the Century
Turns, 49 AM. J. COMp. L. 1, 13 (2001) (identifying conflicts theories used by each American
state); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2002: Sixteenth Annual
Survey, 51 AM. J. COmp. L. 1, 4-5 (2003) (noting no change in the number of vested-rights theory
states since the 2000 survey); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 9, 26 (2004) (same).
14 "[T]he only justification for allowing a party to recover when the cause of action arose in
another civilized jurisdiction is a well founded belief that it was a cause of action in that place.
The right to recover stands upon that as its necessary foundation." Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222
U.S. 473, 479 (1912) (Holmes, J.).
is Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds, supra note 6, at 244.
16 See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH.
L. REv. 2448, 2469 (1999).
17 See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, supra note 6; Currie, Methods and
Objectives, supra note 6; Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, supra note 6; Currie, The Disin-
terested Third State, supra note 6 (often cited as moderating Currie's view, although I think it
merely clarifies what his view had always been); see also Currie, Married Women's Contracts,
supra note 6; Currie, Survival of Actions, supra note 6; Currie, Displacement of the Law, supra
note 6; Currie & Schreter, Privileges and Immunities, supra note 6 (discussing constitutional
objections to interest analysis); Currie & Schreter, Equal Protection, supra note 6 (same); Currie,
Romero Case, supra note 6; Currie & Lieberman, supra note 6; Currie, Justice Traynor, supra
note 6; Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, supra note 6 (discussing the constitu-
tional challenges); Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds, supra note 6.
18 In a 1963 article, Currie wrote:
[A]nalysis may at first indicate an apparent conflict of interests; specifically, it
may be clear that if the forum were to assert an interest in the application of its
[Vol. 107
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analysis nonnationalist and means that fewer internationalist concessions are
made under it than under nationalism. Brainerd Currie, the inventor of interest
analysis, argued that judges are well-equipped neither for the forecasting of for-
eign responses required by nationalism nor for the political-philosophic balanc-
ing and bounding of different states' interests required by internationalism.'
9
Professor Currie defended interest analysis only given the judiciary as a state's
private-international-law-implementing mechanism.
20
Modem critiques of interest analysis hold that it defers insufficiently to
the claims to regulatory authority or, equivalently, independence from regula-
tion of foreign states and their citizens. State-subject theories require a connec-
tion between the party disadvantaged by regulatory action and the regulating
state that justifies the disadvantage. A citizen's obligation to obey law is con-
ditional on the justifying characteristics of his relationship to the state. But,
state-subject theories claim the same is true for aliens-a state's authority to
regulate is generally conditional on the justifying characteristics of the relation-
ship between it and those it regulates. Law-and-economics scholars suggest
that due respect for all people demands a private international law that maxi-
mizes global welfare.23 On this view, private international law is a way of bar-
policy, it would be constitutionally justified in doing so. But no principle dic-
tates that a state exploit every possible conflict, or exert to the outermost lim-
its its constitutional power. On the contrary, to assert a conflict between the
interests of the forum and the foreign state is a serious matter; the mere fact
that a suggested broad conception of a local interest will create conflict with
that of a foreing state is a sound reason why the conception should be re-
examined, with a view to a more moderate and restrained interpretation both
of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must be applied to effectu-
ate the forum's legitimate purpose.
Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963).
Some scholars have interpreted this article as a withdrawal by Currie from his earlier hard-line
position.
19 Brainerd Currie, Notes on Method and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 8 DUKE L. J. 171,
176-77 (1959).
20 Currie thought "[w]e would be better off if Congress were to give some attention to prob-
lems of private law, and were to legislate concerning the choice between conflicting state interests
in some of the specific areas in which the need for solution is serious." Id at 177.
21 See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 7, at ch. 5; Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and
Political Theory, supra note 7; Brilmayer, Interstate Federalism, supra note 7; Brilmayer, Rights,
Fairness and Choice of Law, supra note 7; Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community and State Borders,
supra note 7, at 1-3; cf Dane, supra note 7 (discussing an alternative internationalist theory).
22 Public international law has long been burdened by analogies between the society of states
and the society of individuals within a state. See generally Edwin D. Dickinson, The Analogy
Between Natural Persons and International Persons in the Law of Nations, 26 YALE L. J. 564
(1917).
23 See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEo. L. J. 883, 884-85, 894
(2002); Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U.
2005]
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nessing state behavior in service of the common good.24 Drawing on the litera-
ture on the definition of property rights,2 5 some scholars want private interna-
tional law to define and allocate rights to regulatory authority such that ex-.... 26
change mechanisms move them to their highest-valuing users. Finally, scaf-
folding theories justify international cooperation as a bet on the benefits that
would arise from a closer international community.27 Since the nature and value
of those benefits is uncertain, scaffolding theories rest on an internationalist
faith-a faith that is easier to muster the closer one thinks is the alignment and
the swifter one thinks is the convergence of the interests of the states in ques-
tion. Each of these theories, because they all condition the legitimacy of regula-
tory authority on a due accommodation of foreign ends, is an internationalist
theory of private international law.
Law-and-economics scholars have also fielded the theory closest to na-
tionalism. Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner argue that states should maximize
domestic welfare when they set private international law, 28 just as they should
CHI. L. REv. 1151, 1151-52 (2000); Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Choice of Law, 90
GEO. L. J. 957 (2002) (applauding this general approach).
24 Cf Frank I. Michelman, Why Voting?, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 985, 994-95 (2001) ("It
smacks of constitutional contrivance to wring just outcomes out of men who are not angels-out
of political actors none of whom intentionally pursue just outcomes.").
25 See generally R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988); R. H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 AM. EcON. Rnv. 347 (1967).
26 See Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
11-15 (2001).
27 I associate this view with, for example, Louis Henkin and Arthur von Mehren. The object
of some strong-form scaffolding views is, "while recognizing national sovereignty, nonetheless [to
work] to displace its authority gradually in an every [sic] proliferating array of policy areas." Ken
I. Kersch, The "Globalized Judiciary" and the Rule of Law, in THE GoOD SOCIETY (forthcoming
Fall 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-600680 at 3.
28 "One [argument] focuses on U.S. national interest, and maintains that the welfare of U.S.
citizens would be enhanced in the fairer, safer, and more prosperous world that would result from
increasing assistance to others. I have no quibble with this form of argument, which in my view
properly focuses on what is best for U.S. citizens .... " Jack L. Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy
and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1667, 1668 (2003) (emphasis added). Professor Gold-
smith goes on to compare this argument with one that favors internationalist concessions for their
own sake, or out of "cosmopolitan duty." Id.
Most of this literature is advanced as descriptive, although its authors appear to endorse
welfare-maximizing nationalism as a normative matter. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A.
Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1113, 1113 (1999) (arguing
that customary international law results merely from the coincidence of interests of the states
involved and lacks any further binding authority, for example, moral); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric
A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective,
31 J. LEG. STUD. 115, 115 (2002) (replying to arguments that states' use of moral and legal rheto-
ric is evidence to the contrary); Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey Inter-
national Law?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1901, 1918 (2003) ("The more plausible view is that the law is
[Vol. 107
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when setting other aspects of their law. This welfare-maximization theory is the
only instance of nationalism in the literature. It is a weak form of nationalism
because it combines the claim that private international law should maximize
the attainment of state objectives with the claim that state objectives should be
some function of the welfare of citizens or other relevant persons.2 9 The strong-
form nationalism here defended instead holds that states should set private inter-
national law to best advance the ends that justify their domestic law whatever
those ends happen to be. Unlike the welfare-maximization theory, naturalism,
and internationalism, strong-form nationalism says nothing about what ends a
state's political process should endorse.
Afirst-order view requires commitment to the characteristic claim of its
type. First-order nationalism requires commitment to the claim that states
should set private international law to maximize the attainment of the ends justi-
fying their law as a whole. A second-order view requires only that a particular
set of legal decision-makers act as though they held a first-order view. Second-
order nationalism might require only that federal judges act as though they were
first-order nationalists. Such a theory would be consistent with first-order inter-
nationalism if federal judges would otherwise make more internationalist con-. - • 30
cessions than appropriate even under first-order internationalism. Interest
built up out of rational self-interest."). A theory of why private-international-law decision-makers
would maximize domestic welfare is notably absent. See, e.g., Posner, Do States Have a Moral
Obligation to Obey International Law, supra, at 1918 (noting the arguments that legal decision-
makers may be "under the spell of a legalistic ideology; they may make unrealistic assumptions
about the enforceability of international law; or they [may] simply make some other error in moral
reasoning" but finding that "none of these seems plausible."). Compare Goldsmith, Liberal De-
mocracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, supra, at 1669-70 (arguing that the design of liberal democra-
cies makes it difficult to sacrifice national welfare), with Casey B. Mulligan et al., Do Democra-
cies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 52 (2004)
("[D]emocratic institutions have important effects on the degree of competition for public office,
but otherwise have effects on public policies that are insignificant.").
29 And even if states did not in fact maximize welfare one suspects that Goldsmith and Posner
would nevertheless want them-or their legal decision-makers-to use private international law to
come closer to a welfare-maximizing law generally.
30 Professor Kersch illustrates this:
[T]he U.S. Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision and
the judge-led 'rights revolution' it inaugurated ... proved highly influential
around the world, inspiring many countries to accept the radical empowerment
of their judiciaries at the expense of democratically elected legislatures.
Brown, the proliferation of litigation advocacy groups it inspired, and the rise
of public law litigation, reversed the traditional progressive suspicion of
judges . . . and helped create the modern identification of judicial power with
progress, civil liberties, and civil rights. The rise of Kantian legal theory, in
turn, which envisaged the judge as the heroic tribune of universal morality, re-
inforced the moral authority-and, hence, political power-of the judge, and
inflated his governing pretensions worldwide.
Kersch, supra note 27, at 5.
20051
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analysis is a second-order naturalist theory because it commands judges to be-
have as though a naturalist theory (in which the bounds of sovereignty are im-
mediate interest) were true but can be consistent with either nationalism (if, be-
cause of other internationalist-biasing factors, having judges act this way best
advances domestic interests) or internationalism (if, because of other nationalist-
biasing factors, having judges act this way best respects the political-philosophic
claims of other states and their citizens).
3 1
For those involved in pushing this ... judicial empowerment with the aim of
advancing stipulated public policies in the face of democratic resistance or in-
difference, preserving 'the mask' of law is essential. The most effective way
of proceeding.., is by working incrementally off-shore, quietly creating new
'norms' and 'law' through small insertions of language into international dec-
larations and other documents, and then appealing to them in arguments made
before judges ....
Id. at 11. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith note the success of such efforts: "International and
U.S. courts now rely on General Assembly resolutions, multilateral treaties, and other interna-
tional pronouncements as evidence of [customary international law] without rigorous examination
of whether these pronouncements reflect the actual practice of states." Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 839 (1997).
I am reminded of the old story that Austin Wakeman Scott, wanting to establish a new
principle in the law of trust, wrote it into an edition of his treatise, waited for a court to cite it as
authority, and then cited that decision in subsequent editions. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra, at 836 (describing similar bootstrapping process for federalization of customary interna-
tional law)
31 Another way of putting this is that Currie's interest analysis is directed at judges applying
law silent on its face as to conflicts of law; interest analysis has nothing to say to legislators, ex-
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Because first- and second-order views of different types are compatible,
disagreement over first-order views need not preclude agreement on outcomes.
A first-order nationalist who must convince truth-motivated others to put his
ideas into effect can convince them either of the truth of nationalism or of the
intemationalist bias of the relevant legal decision-makers. The second approach
skirts philosophical matters in favor of an empirical question-whether such a
bias exists-although with the flavor of a sneak attack. Such an approach is
useful when it is costly simply to walk past those who disagree.
32
III. NATIONALISM
This Part states the nationalist theory and offers a framework for its ap-
plication by legal decision-makers. Subpart A presents nationalism as the nor-
mal law-application process applied to cases made difficult by the Fact of Over-
lap. Subparts B and C identify externalities of sovereignty and costs of sover-
eignty, respectively, that a nationalist legal decision-maker must weigh in set-
ting private international law.
A. Fidelity to Law: The Institutional Argument
When hard cases test the scope of legal rules, judges check to see if ap-
plying the rule in question to the type of case at bar would advance the ends that
justify the rule. 33 Analogical reasoning in law depends on identifying similari-
32 Table 1 classifies the leading theories of private international law using the offered taxon-
omy, and roughly dates each to give a sense of the historical development in American private-
international-law theory.
Naturalist Nationalist Internationalist
First-Order Territorialism and Attainment of State Objec- State-Subject Connection
Vested Rights Theo- tives (strong form) (Brilmayer 1987)
ries (Beale 1935) (Camara 2004) Global Welfare Maximiza-
Domestic Welfare Maxi- tion (Guzman 2002)
mization (weak form) Scaffolding / International
(Goldsmith & Posner Framework
1999)
Second- Interest Analysis Correcting International Correcting Domestic Bias
Order (Currie 1960) Bias (Camara 2004) (Camara 2004)
Consistency / Pre-
dictability
Table 1: Normative Theories of Private International Law
33 "[W]hen [judges] are called upon to say how far existing rules are to be extended or re-
stricted, they must let the welfare of society fix the path, its direction and its distance." BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 67 (1921); see also William F. Baxter,
Choice ofLaw and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1963). Before the relation of the
facts of the case to the purposes of a rule is checked to test the rule's applicability, there is a pre-
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ties and differences between the facts of the case at bar and sets of facts to
which the rule in question is admittedly applicable or inapplicable. Only rele-
vant factual distinctions matter--distinctions that alter the degree to which ap-
plication of the rule would advance its justifying end.34
The ends of law emerge from and are justified by a state's political
processes.35 Judges' failure to decide cases with reference to these ends is what
liminary question of the rule's validity: its normative claim to be applied if applicable. A legal
system's test for validity is its rule of recognition, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-
110 (2d. 1994), or, for concreteness, its constitution. Cf United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal
Village, 49(4) P.D. 221 (Israel 1995) (Barak, C.J.) ("when the constitution is silent [the rule]
depends upon the culture and tradition of the legal system").
34 So it is rightly taught in first-year courses on legal argument. Consider, for example, a
common-law court that in Crown v. Williston fined Williston for stabbing Corbin during a heated
argument over the parol evidence rule. In variation one, the court authorizes the fine "to deter
similar stabbings." In variation two, the court authorizes the fine "to satisfy the tastes of citizens
for retribution." A year later, the Crown prosecutes Corbin for stabbing Williston to avenge his
invaluable honor, seeking the same fine the court imposed in Williston. In scenario A, the Willis-
ton rule is not applicable because the cases are unlike on the relevant dimension: Corbin could not
have been deterred because his honor is, to him, invaluable. In scenario B, the Williston rule is
applicable because the cases are alike on what is, this time, the relevant dimension: there was a
stabbing giving rise to public tastes for retribution.
On analogical reasoning in philosophy, see, for example, AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND
FREEDOM 39 (2002) (explaining that the concept of rationality must specify appropriate ends to
exclude the person who intelligently and systematically cuts off his toes) and ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 86 (1981) ("Classification ... takes place within an assumed or
already given abstract space wherein points differ in closeness . . . . If the dimensions were
changed by which closeness was judged, if different dimensions were salient, a different classifi-
cation[ ] .. .would result."). On analogical reasoning in law, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein,
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REv. 741, 745, 753-54, 756-57, 773-74 (1993) (although
Sunstein emphasizes that analogical reasoning on the ground operates at a low level of generality,
id. at 747, 753, he agrees with me that the end of analogical reasoning must be ultimate principles,
id. at 753-54, 778, 785-86, and, consequently, that analogical reasoning fails in the face of ulti-
mate disagreement, id. at 769-70); James R. Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29
UCLA L. REv. 833, 850, 852, 853, 870 (1982) (importance of relevance); Wilson Huhn, The
Stages ofLegal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REv. 305, 317, 356-58
(2003) (labeling what I call analogy as realism). On analogical reasoning in practice, see, for
example, Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY L. J. 1197,
1214-29 (2001) (citing Alan L. Tyree, Fact Content Analysis of Case Law: Methods and Limita-
tions, 22 JUR1MnTRICs J. 1 (1981); ALAN L. TYREE, EXPERT SYSTEMS IN LAW (1989); JAMES
POPPLE, A PRAGMATIC LEGAL EXPERT SYSTEM (1996). See generally Sunstein, supra at 741 n.3
(collecting sources); Hunter, supra at 1203 n.25 (collecting sources).
35 Legal rules are applicable when their purposes are furthered by their application. When two
or more legal rules with origins of equal normative weight come into conflict, we refer to the
process of resolution as balancing. Balancing requires that the purpose that unifies the conflicting
legal rules, either a weighting of each against the others or a true resolution that avoids the appar-
ent conflict, be identified, and the rule applied that best advances that purpose. Although I rely on
legal decision-makers being able to do something of this sort, I do not elaborate the process of
decision with reference to legal purpose further. Instead, I adopt by reference RONALD.DWORKIN,
LAW'S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986) ("[Pjropositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the
principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive inter-
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unifies formalism, or decision abstracted from purpose; naturalism, or decision
for purposes floating free of the law; and skeptical legal realism, or decision for
the judge's purposes.36 Each of these involves infidelity to law because each
replaces the political processes ordinarily responsible for the ends of law with
some other normative source-a formal system, the judge's breakfast, or, in
private international law, the political processes of states of which the judge is
not an official. 37 When the outcome of a case changes as a result, the judge has
put state force behind law not legitimated by passage through its political proc-
esses: extra-constitutional law.38 Nationalism's central claim is that it is ordi-
narily wrong for legal decision-makers to apply extra-constitutional law for the
same reason it is ordinarily wrong for them to apply unconstitutional law: their
offices offer no warrant for such exercises of state power.39
The legal decision-maker in question need not be a judge. Legal deci-
sion-makers-judges, executive officers, legislators, &c.--can be thought of as
primary or subsidiary. Subsidiary decision-makers owe fidelity to externally
specified bodies of law. The judge applying a statute is the paradigm, but ad-
ministrative officers carrying out executive orders are similarly situated. Pri-
mary decision-makers, by contrast, themselves endow bodies of law with legal
authority. The legislator framing a statute is the paradigm, but the judge decid-
ing a novel question at common law is similarly situated.
40
pretation of the community's legal practice.") and Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L.
REv. 1057, 1103-05 (1975) (explaining that hard cases are decided according to "the political
morality presupposed by the laws and institutions of the community").
36 Analogical reasoning with reference to the purposes animating valid rules of law results in
"a particular conception of community morality [being] decisive of legal issues; .. .the political
morality presupposed by the laws and institutions of the community." Dworkin, Hard Cases,
supra note 35, at 1105.
37 See generally Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REv. 665, 680-84, 716-31 (1986); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The
Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 345-49
(1996).
38 In this lies the distinction between courts as checks on democracy and courts as its guaran-
tors. When courts trump present, democratically expressed wishes by enforcing prior law democ-
ratically enacted at a higher level, there is no conflict between judicial power and its democratic
justification--the justification, also, for the duty of obedience operating even in the absence of
judicial power. But when courts trump democratic wishes without reference to such prior, higher
law itself justified by democratic credentials, their decisions must be justified, if at all, with refer-
ence to outside normative sources; and this holds even (especially?) when courts "enforce" cur-
rent but not-yet-enacted democratic views. The process of enactment is a check on democratic
excess that itself possesses prior, higher democratic credentials. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V.
Ratification of judicial circumvention of that process by silence or anything other than equally
powerful enactment is a bootstrap, not a justification.
39 Cf Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. 473 (1893) (describing ultra vires act as breach of trust); Sell-
ers v. Head, 73 So. 2d 747, 750 (Ala. 1954).
40 But see, e.g., DwoRKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 35 (judge constrained by dutiful inter-
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Actual legal decision-makers fall between the paradigms. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission endows rules with legal authority but is con-
strained in so doing by the terms of its congressional mandate. A trade minister
may be authorized to decide whether prosecution of agribusiness or Microsoft
would best advance competitive markets but not whether to advance competitive
markets or protect a favored industry.
Primary decision-makers create law for reasons. These reasons include
crude self-interest, as where the moneyed interests purchase laws; command
from a higher authority, e.g. Church or Party; and moral or political obligations
realized after reasoned reflection, e.g. those encompassed by utilitarian or liber-
tarian political-philosophic systems. Law enacted for such personal reasons is
justified because of the institutional position of the primary decision-makers
involved:41 they are the part of the political system that makes the law. The
justifying characteristics of that political system-what creates a duty of obedi-
ence to its law-justify the law that primary decision-makers make for reasons
rooted in the system even if it allows decision-makers to deviate from institu-
tional ends. A system that allows for deviation may yet be justified because the
deviations it permits are politically acceptable 42 or not amenable to review at
acceptable cost.
43
The justifying characteristics of the political system thus justify devia-
tions by legal decision-makers from institutional ends to the extent these are
necessary to benefits of the political system more valuable in terms of those
ends than the deviations are costly. If political campaigns are necessary to the
political system because of the legitimacy they confer on the operators of gov-
ernment, then deviations caused by them are part of that system and justified by
its justifying characteristics. But these characteristics do not justify deviations
made for extrasystemic reasons because, being unnecessary to the system, they
are not part of it. Deviations caused by deference to other political systems are
extrasystemic in this sense. The warrant for their imposition must lie elsewhere
than in the justifying characteristics of the political processes in place.
pretation of institutional practice). Even here the constraints of precedent, made applicable by
analogy, tradition, and ethos-the whole common-law situation-sense-appreciably constrain
judicial decision-making. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 19-61 (1960). Novel questions often have right answers.
41 But the motives of legal decision-makers in enacting law need not be the same as the ends
underlying the law they enact for purposes of subsequent maximization. "It is what they did, not
why they did it."
42 By which I mean "not terribly bad" so that the costs and risks of transitioning to a new
system outweigh the potential benefits.
43 When deviations exceed this limit, there is a failure of justificationfor the system. Revolu-
tion looms. And this is not to say that institutional review mechanisms may not exist. Where they
do exist, primary decision-making authority rests not with an individual but rather with an institu-
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When a primary decision-maker finds that his reason for enacting a
body of law is X, he should design that body of law so as to best advance X. By
failing to do so he authorizes a use of state force not justified by the political
processes that empower him to issue such an authorization. He wields power
without warrant, acts ultra vires, and puts in place extraconstitutional law.
For slightly more concreteness, consider a senator writing an antitrust
statute. After reasoned reflection (and everything else the constitution calls on
him to do) he concludes that he should write laws that maximize the welfare of
the citizens of his state. He consults economists who advise him to design the
antitrust statute to promote competitive markets. Acting on their advice, he con-
cludes that the definition of anticompetitive behavior should be such-and-such.
Having done this, he should set the other components of the antitrust statute-its
rules for calculating damages, its applicability to nonprofits, its empowerment of
prosecutors and rulemaking administrators, &c. -in the way that best promotes
competitive markets. It would be inconsistent for the senator to pick one of
these rules and set it to serve a different end; more, it would result in extracon-
stitutional law because of the senator's antecedent decision, resulting from the
political processes in place, that he should write the law that best promotes
competitive markets. 44 Having identified the end to be advanced by a body of
law, the primary decision-maker becomes subsidiary: judges and legislators
alike-all legal decision-makers-in most of what they do, are bound to ad-
vance ends antecedently ordained.
Legal decision-makers should decide cases made difficult by the Fact of
Overlap in the same way: by applying the rule that best advances the ends justi-
fying domestic law given the facts, including the Fact of Overlap, of the case at
bar. This rule need not be the domestic rule in any of the interested states; a
compromise adopted by multiple states might lead to better results than would
each state applying its own domestic rule to those cases within its de facto juris-
diction.4 5  The Fact of Overlap is often relevant in selecting the optimal rule
(often affects the degree to which application of a rule advances its justifying
ends) because other interested states' responses to the application of a legal rule
44 Extraconstitutional law can be both unconstitutional and binding on other legal decision-
makers, for example, judges. A constitutional preamble commanding laws "for the general wel-
fare" might be violated by a statute enacted to benefit the Ballihurton Corporation, even though a
judge would be bound to give the statute full effect.
45 See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 394
(1979) (describing joint agency created by Nevada and California to regulate Lake Tahoe); Arthur
von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in
Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347, 348 (1974). One of Professor
von Mehren's examples concerns the domestic policy favoring uniformity of judgments, which
might best be advanced by adoption of a distinct rule for international situations if adopting that
rule would induce its reciprocal adoption by other states with de facto regulatory power over the
situations of interest. See id. at 365-70; see also Elissa A. Okoniewski, Yahoo!, Inc. v. LICRA:
The French Challenge to Free Expression on the Internet, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 295, 337
(2002) (proposing creation of an International Court for international issues).
20051
15
Camara: Costs of Sovereignty
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
may affect the advancement of the ends justifying domestic law. After a one-
paragraph detour to correct a doctrinal distortion in the literature, 46 the balance
of this Part sets out the ways in which the Fact of Overlap can constitutionally
change the applicable rule of law.
I have so far applied a general method of legal decision-making, famil-
iar from other areas of the law, to private international law. It applies equally to
all branches of that subject. The effect of private international law is to deter-
mine the scope of a state's claims to sovereignty in the face of the Fact of Over-
lap. A branch of private international law is therefore important insofar as it
affects the scope of these claims. If cases heard in France and Kentucky or
London and Beijing are decided essentially identically when both courts agree
that English law is applicable, then choice of law is more important than juris-
diction. 7 But if variations in institutional quality or in other social, economic,
political, or cultural factors, strongly affect outcomes in spite of choice of law,
then jurisdictional rules are more important.48 This debate turns on an empirical
question-viz., on what impact these social, economic, political, and cultural
forces have on the administration of formal law. But the important point is that
arguments in choice-of-law scholarship made on the assumption that choice of
law is dominant often are equally applicable to jurisdiction or enforcement of
judgments on the contrary assumption that one of these is dominant. Neglect of
this point has led to an unfortunate splintering of the literature addressing the
relevance of the Fact of Overlap to legal decision-making: the basic problem of
private international law.
A nationalist might assess the relevance of the Fact of Overlap in two
steps. First, ignoring it, he determines whether the ends justifying domestic law
would be advanced by applying the rule in question to the case at bar. If so,
there is a prima facie case for application of the rule. Second enters private in-
ternational law: does the Fact of Overlap change the applicability of the legal
rule in question?
Internationalist concessions often are justified by nationalism. Nation-
alism demands only that deviations from the result in ordinary, purely domestic
cases be justified in terms of the ends justifying domestic law. Applying a do-
46 Doctrinal divisions in the law-school curriculum-here, the separation of jurisdictional rules
in courses on civil procedure and federal courts from choice-of-law rules in courses on conflicts of
law or private international law--often distort functionalist legal thinking. See generally K.A.D.
CAMARA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN LAW, preface (draft ed. 2003) (identifying the
doctrinal distortion in legal scholarship generally).
47 E.g., "To believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state should be stronger under
the due process clause for jurisdiction purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused
is more concerned with where he will be hanged than whether." Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 88 (1978); James Martin, Personal Jurisdic-
tion and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REv. 872, 873 (1980) (arguing that contacts sufficient to
support specific jurisdiction are a prerequisite to legitimate application of forum law).
48 I thank Professor Arthur von Mehren for making this point clear to me.
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mestic rule in the face of the Fact of Overlap may cause other interested states to
respond in ways that negatively affect attainment of these ends. By declining to
apply domestic law, legal decision-makers can avoid these undesirable re-
sponses, better advancing the ends justifying domestic law, all things consid-
ered.
In a world of nationalists, internationalist concessions come only at the
price of reciprocal concessions. The more a state has to offer in terms of fur-
thering the ends of other states, the greater are the internationalist concessions
other states will be willing to offer in return. Nationalism would justify French
enforcement of a Russian judgment contrary to French law only if, for example,
this would likely lead to reciprocal Russian enforcement of French judgments.
And China ought not to apply a human-rights law it would otherwise not apply
unless, for example, Europe would then make its product markets more accessi-
ble to the Chinese. These are the sorts of justifications that support nationalist
claims to the application of anything other than domestic law.
A state's regulation, when the Fact of Overlap holds, may interfere with
other states' pursuit of their own regulatory interests. I call the foreign effects
of a state's claims to regulatory authority externalities of sovereignty. A state
can punish such externality-imposing foreign regulation by imposing costs of
sovereignty on the regulating state. The next Subparts identify three types of
externalities of sovereignty and three types of costs of sovereignty, including the
purposeful imposition of externalities of sovereignty. Costs of sovereignty suf-
fered by a state are the negative effects in terms of attainment of the ends justi-
fying its law that might justify a change in its legal rules in light of the Fact of
Overlap. For a nationalist, they are the determinants of private international
law.
B. Externalities of Sovereignty
Regulation by one state (the imposing state) of conduct in which an-
other state (the spillover state) is interested adversely affects the attainment of
the ends justifying the spillover state's law when the imposing state's law is
wrong from its perspective. The simplest case of wrong law is that in which the
legal rule applied by the imposing state serves ends other than those served by
the legal rule the spillover state would prefer. Further, however, the imposing
state generates externalities of sovereignty when its regulation, although aimed
at the same end and equally effective alone, interacts negatively with the con-
current regulation of the spillover state; and when its regulation, by limiting the
enforcement power of the spillover state, effectively forecloses the spillover
state's most preferred regulatory option. Each type of externality of sovereignty
is ultimately a form of wrong law: the imposing state's regulation of conduct by
a legal rule other than that the spillover state prefers.
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1. Simple Wrong Law
A state imposes a simple wrong-law externality when it applies law that
is wrong from the spillover state's perspective in a case in which that state is
interested. Simple wrong-law externalities arise because the ends justifying the
laws of different states point to different outcomes in particular cases. State A
seeks to maximize its citizens' welfare, while state B seeks the same except thatS 49
it prefers never to use certain cruel punishments. If A punishes theft with ex-
cruciating, cheap-to-inflict pain and applies that punishment, which B would
find unacceptably cruel despite its excellent deterrent effect on theft, to a case in
which B is interested, A will have imposed on B a simple wrong-law externality.
A state can impose wrong-law externalities even though its formal
choice of law selects the law of the spillover state. States A and B might agree
that A's law is applicable, and yet B might be incapable of applying that law in
precisely the way that would a court of A. A law refers a damages issue to the
jury. B may agree that this law controls, but the result in B may nevertheless be
different because, for cultural, economic, social, or other reasons, B juries award
higher or lower damages than do A juries. If the end justifying A's referring
damages issues to juries is tied to the size of the resulting jury awards, then B
imposes a wrong-law externality even if it refers the damages issue to a jury.
On the other hand, it imposes no such externality if the end justifying A's law is
not tied to the resulting jury award: A might send issues to juries simple to sat-
isfy a popular taste. Wrong-law externalities are measured in terms of the ends
of the states involved.
Consider another example. State D might agree that the law of state C
controls a particular issue but be unable to determine the content of that law.
Courts of D might misunderstand the legal materials of C, rely on incorrect ex-
pert testimony about C law, or fall back on erroneous presumptions about the
content of foreign law in general. 50 In these A-B and C-D cases, the wrong-law
externality arises unintentionally, as a consequence of the inability of B and D to
apply a particular foreign law. Jurisdictional rules often acquire importance
beyond the cost of travel because of such limits in private-international-law
technology.
2. Inconsistent Law
A state imposes an inconsistent-law externality when it applies law that
alone would advance the ends justifying the spillover state's law as much as
would application of that state's own law, but which advances those ends less
because of the concurrent application by the spillover state of its own law. Sup-
49 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment).
50 See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L.
REv. 964, 979-80 (1958) (citing cases and further commentary).
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pose states A and B both want adequately informed capital markets for their
own, possibly different, higher-order reasons. Mandatory disclosure and merit
regulation (under which the state investigates a firm's operations before licens-
ing its participation in the capital markets) may be equally effective means of
pursuing this end.5t The concurrent application of both systems, however, may
be worse in terms of obtaining adequately informed capital markets than the
application of either system alone. If so, A's mandatory-disclosure regime
imposes a cost of inconsistent law when applied to cases in which B applies its
merit-regulation regime, and vice versa: B's application of a merit-regulation
regime to these cases imposes an inconsistent-law externality on A.
53
Either state may have adopted its regulatory form for reasons that make
adopting the alternative undesirable. A disclosure regime might be cheaper for
A because it already has a scalable disclosure-enforcement system in place for
the regulation of public utilities. Merit regulation might be cheaper for B be-
cause it already has a general policy of licensing commerce. Either state might
nevertheless eliminate the inconsistent-law externality by, instead of adopting
the alternative regulatory form, simply allowing the other state to be the sole
regulator.
This approach can be costly, however, because the regulating state must
process an increased case load;54 it may be difficult to distinguish cases in
which both states are interested, and hence the internationalist compromise is
applicable, from those in which only one state is interested, and hence domestic
law should apply; domestic political systems may be designed to resist regula-
tory delegation to foreign entities, which might be good or bad from the per-
spective of attaining a state's ends; 55 and deferring now may increase the cost of
regulating later in light of a divergence in state ends.
51 See, e.g., Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 32-45
(2004).
52 1 thank Professor Andrew Guzman for suggesting the example.
53 In the antitrust context, see, for example, Frederic Jenny, Competition, Trade and Develop-
ment Before and After Cancun, 2003 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 631, 640 (Barry Hawk, ed., 2004)
(noting lack of "operational sovereignty" where cumulative regulation results in greater total
regulation than under any state's laws applied alone), cited in Blumenthal, supra note 9, at 274.
54 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Whither the UDRP: Autonomous, Americanized or Cosmo-
politan?, Princeton Law & Public Affairs Research Paper No. 03-010 at 8 (2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=437182.
55 "Nations differ in regard to how much 'freedom' they are prepared to sacrifice for some
common enterprise or to some supranational institution." Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE
30(1979).
Attitudes toward international law reflect a nation's constitution, its laws and
institutions, its history and traditions, its values and 'style.' Indeed ... it
seems permissible to suggest that some nations are more law-abiding than
others by reason of their national 'morality' and 'character.' Some govern-
ments seem especially sensitive to the stigma-the 'guilt'-of violating inter-
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These problems can all be reduced to a single cost of the cheapest re-
gime that would satisfy both states. Nationalist states would adopt that cheapest
regime if and only if the inconsistent-law externalities for each state exceed the
cost of the cheapest regime. 56 This process is more complicated when regula-
tion concurrently imposes inconsistent-law and wrong-law externalities. The
presence of both explains why nationalist states may resist unifying changes that
would avoid inconsistent-law externalities at the cost of what appear from the
outside to be mere details, but which, given the justifying ends of a state's law,
it would entail accepting large wrong-law externalities to sacrifice.
Externalities of inconsistent law include not only situations like the se-
curities-regulation example, in which concurrent regulation is possible but on
balance detrimental, but also situations in which the alternative laws are flatly
inconsistent: drive on the left versus drive on the right. What makes this case
easy (and, though simple, notice it is real), is that it is easy to assign classes of
cases to regulatory rules on the basis of physical territory (the costs of the
cheapest regime, including the costs of sorting cases, are low) and the precise
outcome is much less important than the avoidance of concurrently applied con-
flicting laws from the perspective of all states involved (the inconsistent-law
externality dwarfs the wrong-law externality). Still, nonunification imposes
transaction costs on private parties operating across legal regimes.57 The inter-
national driver must investigate and keep track of the side of the road on which
he is to drive. These costs constitute externalities of sovereignty to the extent
costs inflicted on private parties factor into the ends of the states involved.
3. Inefficient Scope
An imposing state's refusal to cooperate may force the spillover state to
apply laws of inefficient scope: second-best laws enacted because first-best laws
national law. Some have a stronger sense that national 'honor' or 'duty' re-
quires the observance of law and of agreement.
Id. at 61-62. Cf Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 1668 (noting effects of the liberal democratic struc-
ture for a state's ability to discount national welfare).
56 Consider a simple case in which there exists some cheapest equally effective regime that
could be implemented entirely by either state acting alone. The cost of this regime for either state
is C, and the cost of the current regulatory regime of each state is CA and C5 respectively, so that
the marginal cost of adoption of the cheapest regime for each state is C - CA for state A and C -
C5 for state B. The cheapest regime in the text will then be adoption of the cheapest regime by the
state for which the marginal cost of adoption is least: assume it is A. If the marginal cost of adop-
tion exceeds the cost of inconsistent laws state A suffers, IA, but is exceeded by the sum of the
costs of inconsistent laws for both states, C - CA < IA + I, B will pay A to induce it to adopt the
cheapest regime. More generally, the cheapest regime might involve implementation in part by A
and in part by B; so long as the sum of the costs of inconsistent laws for all states exceeds the sum
of the marginal cost of adoption for all states, there is room for a deal of this sort.
57 See, e.g., Blumenthal, The Challenge of Sovereignty, supra note 9, at 272 (private costs of
multiplicity of antitrust/competition-law regimes).
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would require enforcement too costly in light of the imposing state's refusal.
Consider the bankruptcy of a corporation with operations in states A and B. 58 A
would prefer reorganization to liquidation if all of the firm's assets are available
for reorganization, but would prefer liquidation otherwise. Some of the assets
are under the effective control of B in that it would be very costly for A to con-
trol their disposition. Seizing these assets, let us say, would require officers of A
to intrude on B's territory, an invasion that B would forcibly resist. B's bank-
ruptcy law has no provision for reorganizations. B bankruptcies always result in
liquidation. In this situation, B's mandatory liquidation rule coupled with its
effective control of some of the assets imposes an externality of inefficient
scope on A in that A, unable to involve all the assets in its reorganization, is
driven to adopt its second-best rule, liquidation. The effect is that all of the as-
sets, both those in B and those in A, are liquidated.
The boundary between each type of wrong-law externality, but particu-
larly between simple wrong-law and inefficient-scope externalities, is blurry. In
the bankruptcy hypothetical, B's liquidation of the assets under its control can
be thought of as simple wrong law, and the cost in terms of attainment of the
ends justifying A's law as a wrong-law externality. Still, the bankruptcy case is
usefully distinguished because in the ordinary case of wrong law, A's preferred
rule can be applied independently to conduct within A's effective control,
whereas in the case of inefficient scope, A cannot apply its preferred rule unless
B cooperates, even to conduct within A's effective control. By contrast, if the
disagreement between A and B is over the enforceability of substantively uncon-
scionable contracts, A and B can enforce or decline to enforce contracts within
their effective control, imposing wrong-law externalities on each other without
blocking each other's ability to do the same. The need for cooperation gives
rise to externalities of inefficient scope.
One reason why problems of inefficient scope merit special attention is
that the disagreement can easily seem to be over a minor matter from the per-
spective of one of the states involved. The wrong-law externality may be small
relative to the inefficient-scope externality. Consider, again, the bankruptcy
hypothetical, except that both A and B think reorganization desirable. Their
disagreement is only over particulars. For A, it is critical that the headquarters
of the reorganized firm be in its territory because it values very much the ability
of its courts swiftly to intervene in corporate affairs. In the absence of A's inter-
est, B would place the headquarters of the reorganized firm in its own territory,
but B cares much less about the location of the headquarters than about there
being a successful reorganization. There is an externality of inefficient scope
imposed on B if A moves to liquidation instead of enforcing B's decision on
placement of the headquarters, and this externality far exceeds the wrong-law
58 1 thank Professor Andrew Guzman for suggesting this example. See also Robert K. Ras-
mussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (1997) ("A
successful reorganization depends on keeping assets spread across various countries in the firm.").
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externality that would have been imposed had the outcome been reorganization,
but with the headquarters in A's territory.
In situations like this, nationalist states should cut a deal: the state for
which the location decision is minor (B) should defer to the state for which it is
major (and which therefore blocks reorganization in cases where the location
decision is wrongly made, forcing liquidation) (A), or pay the state for which it
is major an amount that makes that state neutral between accepting the wrong
location decision plus the payment and blocking the reorganization by moving
to liquidation.
59
This sort of deal suffers, however, from a variety of complications.
Deference may be administratively costly, as where there are lots of apparently
minor issues about which one state feels strongly. If one state feels strongly on
apparently minor issues 1, 2, and 3, but the other feels strongly on apparently
minor issues 4, 5, and 6, one state cannot simply hand over the entire reorgani-
zation to the other. The state running the reorganization must understand the
other state's preferences as to those issues it feels strongly about. Conveying
this information may be costly because experts in foreign law are costly, and
because joint adjudication mechanisms, which would be an alternative to courts
of the reorganizing state learning about foreign preferences second-hand, are
costly. These costs may be especially large in the context of an apparently mi-
nor issue since the importance of the issue for the state for which it is a major
issue may be difficult for a legal decision-maker steeped in the view that the
issue is minor to grasp: there is a greater likelihood of a cultural barrier to un-
derstanding. Payment may also be difficult to arrange because of the cost of
placing a monetary value on the wrong decision on an apparently minor issue.
In particular, states may dislike the very idea of being bought off in this fashion;
as a matter of practice, however, this seems to depend on the subject at issue.
6 1
Inefficient-scope externalities also include distortions of private behav-
ior caused by limits on the enforcement power of states. For example, a state's
59 Let there be an issue, I, with respect to which states A and B have differing preferences,
such that the cost to A of accepting B's preferred resolution off is IA, and the cost to B of accept-
ing A's preferred resolution off is 1B. Let reorganization, R, be available only if both states prefer
it to liquidation, L, and let L be the cost of using liquidation rather than reorganization. I is an
apparently minor issue if either 'A > L and 1B < L, or 'A < L and 'B > L. Take the second case. We
would expect A either to defer to B on I, or to pay B some amount x, which would result in B's
being indifferent between accepting the wrong decision on I plus the payment, and blocking the
reorganization, 1B - L < x < L. A state will defer rather than pay when L - IA < x.
60 Information exchange institutions such as the International Competition Network in the
antitrust field are one way of addressing this problem. See generally Blumenthal, supra note 9.
61 For example, selling the right to travel through a nation's airspace, or to use a nation's terri-
tory as the basis for military operations seems less troublesome than selling the recognition and
enforcement of foreign marriages or a more favorable securities regulation regime. Cf Ward
Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathe-
dral, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 373, 397-406 (1999) (suggesting explanations for hostility to money
transactions over certain rights).
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bankruptcy preference for certain sorts of creditors may distort firms' invest-
ment decisions in favor of investment in places beyond the reach of the mecha-
nisms by which that state enforces its bankruptcy preference. 62 By investing in
such places, the firm is able to shift some of the downside risk of a venture onto
its formerly preferred creditor.63 More generally, consider an asset-protecting
state into which private parties can funnel funds to secure them from the en-
forcement mechanisms of other states. Such a state will attract more assets than
will a state that is less protective of private assets, all else equal; the movement
of assets into such a state might hurt objectives that look favorably on wealth-
maximizing investment. Whether a particular distortion of private behavior is a
negative or positive externality of inefficient scope (or of any sort) will depend
on the particular objectives with reference to the advancement of which the dis-
tortion is assessed: a private distortion may be favorable, of no concern, or un-
favorable from the point of view of a legal decision-maker seeking to maximize
the attainment of the ends justifying a state's law. It may be that the distortion
of private behavior caused by the asset-protecting state in fact furthers the objec-
tives of another state: protecting the wealth expropriated by its dictatorial mas-
ters, for example. In such a case, the distortion would not be a cost of ineffi-
cient scope, but rather a service extended by the asset-protecting state.
C. Costs of Sovereignty
To deter (encourage) the imposition of negative (positive) externalities
of sovereignty by other states, states can purposefully raise (lower) the cost of
externality-creating exercises of sovereignty by imposing costs of sovereignty.
64
The more important the area of imposition to the target state, the costlier will a
given imposition be to that state and thus the greater will be the deterrent effect.
Often, the best way to discourage imposition of externalities of sovereignty in
one area is not to impose costs of sovereignty in the same area, but rather to
target an area more important to the target state. If regulating conduct X is most
important to state A, but regulating conduct Y is most important to state B, then
A can better deter B from wrongly regulating X by imposing costs on B's regula-
tion of Y than on its regulation of X.
In deciding to apply domestic law in the face of a foreign interest, it is
improper to focus exclusively on the sacrifice of a state's own ends as they re-
62 The example is from Lucian A. Bebchuk & Andrew Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J. L. & ECON. 775, 790-93 (1999).
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Exttraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodo-
logical and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 11 (1987) ("The applica-
tion of American ... antitrust law ... [and] securities regulation ... [has provoked] increasing
irritation on the part of certain foreign trading partners, but also occasional retaliatory legislation
by foreign governments .... ").
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late to the area immediately in question. 65 Attention should also be paid to the
possibility of advancing domestic ends in other, more important areas, while
deferring to the foreign interest immediately at issue. Courts should refuse to
enforce punitive damages awards on grounds of public policy whenever, all
things considered, that enforcement would undermine the attainment of ends
justifying domestic law, even if the particular ends so advanced are unrelated to
punitive damages.
1. Externalities of Sovereignty as Imposed Costs
The externalities of sovereignty already examined can themselves con-
stitute costs of sovereignty. One way in which a state can penalize another state
for its wrong antitrust law is by applying a wrong law of bankruptcy in cases in
which the other state is interested. Another is by declining to cede regulatory
authority over securities issues, even though the other state's regulatory regime
is equally effective. And still another is to erect barriers to enforcement of the
other state's laws strong enough to force the other state to adopt a law different
than otherwise it would.
2. Legal Impositions
A state's ordinary legal-judicial proceedings may constitute legal impo-
sitions on other states. One type of legal imposition is that resulting from the
protection by a state of its jurisdiction over a certain category of conduct. Sup-
pose that states A and B are concurrently interested in regulating some particular
private conduct. A can make it more difficult for B to regulate by making it
harder for parties to make use of legal remedies provided by B. Most simply, A
can deny its aid in enforcing judgments of B.66 A need not necessarily stop with
recognition and enforcement, however. A might grant anti-suit injunctions mak-
ing a private party liable in its courts if it invokes legal remedies provided by B,
or grant anti-anti-suit injunctions, enjoining the pursuit by a private party of an
anti-suit injunction in the courts of B.
67
Denial of recognition and enforcement bars access to assets within the
control of the denying state; a state can go further, however, and make the en-
forcement of a foreign judgment abroad itself domestically actionable. 68 Not
65 "The law of the forum is material only as setting a limit of policy beyond which such obli-
gations will not be enforced there." Cuba Ry. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912).
66 See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme, 169 F.Supp.2d
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (denying enforcement to French judgment because of inconsistency with
American policies embedded in the First Amendment), revd', 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) (re-
versed for lack of personal jurisdiction).
67 See generally Schimek, supra note 2; Note, supra note 2.
68 This is called a claw back law. See, e.g., Joseph Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S. and E.U.
Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 159, 197-99 (1999); Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and
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only would a party with a judgment from B be unable to enforce that judgment
on assets in A's effective control, but, if he enforced it by levying on assets in
B's effective control, he would become liable in courts of A for the value of
those assets--conversion with sovereign accomplice.
Legal impositions can also be made in choice of law. Just as A can deny
recognition to a judgment on the grounds that the rendering state lacked jurisdic-
tion, so too can it deny recognition on the grounds that the law applied by the
rendering state was wrong. Substantive review of arbitral awards is an example.
Just as in the jurisdictional case, stronger impositions are also available: injunc-
tions not to invoke the wrong law (like the anti-suit injunction) and affirmative
liability for invoking other states' legal apparatus in aid of wrong law (like the
claw-back statute) are both available.
The above legal impositions are variations in substantive law determin-
ing when and to what extent a foreign judgment will be honored. Procedural
variations also can constitute legal impositions. For example, judgments of B
are more easily enforced if all one must do is present them to a sheriff of A than
if one must present them and explain and justify the foreign law underlying
them to a court of A. A requirement that parties plead and prove the content of
foreign law is more of a legal imposition than a regime in which judges inquire
into foreign law sua sponte. A presumption that unproved law is the same as
domestic law may be a very serious imposition if domestic law is far from the
international norm. A state's rules with respect to extradition, access to court
records (and hence precollected evidence), and access to evidence, including
persons, within that state's control, all may constitute serious legal impositions
in much the same way.
There are also legal impositions even more clearly substantive than
those first considered. A state's willingness to consider legal outcomes else-
where in setting its own law can aid or retard the achievement of other states'
regulatory objectives by aiding or retarding the international convergence of
substantive law. In order from imposing the most to imposing the least cost, a
state might take one of several positions. It might treat foreign legal outcomes
as entirely irrelevant. It might treat foreign legal outcomes as useful for theirS69
reasoning and the light they shed on empirical outcomes under different legal
Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 478, 481 n.13 (2000).
69 See, e.g, Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. 191, 198 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.)
("The decisions of the Courts of every country, so far as they are founded upon a law common to
every country, will be received, not as authority, but with respect."). Justice Kennedy's citation of
Dudgeon v. U.K., 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. 52 (1981) (ban on consensual homosexual conduct violates
European Convention on Human Rights), in Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (same
law unconstitutional) appears to fall within this category. But see id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Much less do [fundamental rights] spring into existence, as the court seems to believe, because
foreign nations decriminalize conduct.") (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., with Breyer, J., concurring) (citing International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doe. A/6014, Art.
1(4), 2(2) (1965) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
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rules. 70 Or it might treat the fact that foreign legal systems have arrived at some
outcome, say the illegality of capital punishment, as itself a reason to reach that
outcome domestically. 7 1 A state can aid the advancement of the objectives of
other states by viewing their legal decisions with more respect.
Women, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, Art. 4(1) (1979) in support of proposition that affirmative action
must eventually end); Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (Stevens, J.) (relying on for-
eign sources, including a brief for the European Union, for its proposition that execution of the
retarded "has become truly unusual"). By classifying these decisions as used for their reasoning, I
take as a given the legal conclusion preceding that use that makes, for example, the commonness
of a certain punishment in foreign countries relevant under United States law. If that conclusion
were included in the analysis, the decisions might well be classified under my third heading, see
infa note 71.
70 See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004) (Scalia, J.); Printz v. U.S.,
521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (The experience of other nations "may... cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem.") (citing European authorities);
Kerseh, supra note 27, at 7 ("Today's administrative justifications for judicial globalization trum-
pet the advantages to American judges of gathering evidence from around the world to improve
the quality of their constitutional interpretations and problemsolving abilities. If other judges have
reasoned about federalism and affirmative action, why should American judges be ignorant of
their thought-processes and decisions?").
71 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103
(2000). The last position might rest on a view that the legal reasoning processes of legal decision-
makers are imperfect signals of an objective reality. That is, all legal decision-makers are striving
toward the same goal, but each particular decision-maker's view of the path is blurred. See, e.g.,
Kersch, supra note 27, at 7 ("Advocates of judicial globalization have defended the process on the
ground[] of... moral universalism."); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1103, 1124 (2000) (judicial globalization "requires recognition of participation in a
common judicial enterprise, independent of the content and constraints of specific national and
international legal systems."). Under these circumstances, the fact that many other legal decision-
makers see the path as extending in a certain way is evidence that the path does extend that way
since the probability that their vision has led them all on the same wrong path is less than the
probability that their vision has led them all on the same correct path. If everyone thinks this way,
however, there is a substantial risk that an initial wrong decision by one or several legal decision-
makers will cascade into a series of wrong decisions by all observers. See Timur Kuran & Cass R.
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683, 761-68 (1999); cf
Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (Kennedy, J.) (citing European Court of Human
Rights decision in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom as evidence of "emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in mat-
ters pertaining to sex," striking down criminalization of homosexual sodomy); Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-50 (Mass. 2003) (citing Lawrence in opinion holding denial
of marriage licenses to homosexuals violates Massachusetts constitution). If the doctrine of
precedent involves balancing efficiency (in not reconsidering issues) and predictability against the
risk of perpetuating wrong decisions, the balance must shift when decisions more likely to be
wrong are considered.
In certain political regimes, citation of and reliance on foreign decisions may actually make
judicial claims to power appear more legitimate; Kersch, supra note 27, at 6 ("For judges in na-
tions that were not so long ago living in isolation and tyranny, drawing a demonstrable connection
to a worldwide project involving a movement toward 'global governance' became a key source of
judicial legitimacy. For them, put otherwise, the process of 'judicial globalization' was itself the
sine qua non of the construction of judicial legitimacy.")
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Finally, states have access to political impositions. These are distin-
guished from legal impositions only in that they are more traditionally political-
executive than legal-judicial. They include, for example, a state's law regarding
complex cooperation in regulatory investigation and enforcement; the applica-
tion of diplomatic pressure; trade sanctions such as tariffs, special preferences,
bans, and blockades; the granting or withholding of aid, whether it be financial,
in the nature of training or other services, or goods such as medicine or food;
and, ultimately, the application of military force.
72
The precise location of the border between legal and political imposi-
tions-is withholding cooperation on antitrust investigations a legal or a politi-
cal imposition?-is arbitrary. On the political side of the line is the territory of
the international-relations specialists. In this literature, the realists are closest to
my own view, although much of the realist work in international-relations the-
ory purports to be positive.
73
The nationalist theory is not that realism is an accurate description of
the world, particularly in the realm of legal impositions, where the special forms
and curious formalities of the law more than occasionally outweigh pragmatic
considerations, 74 but rather that behavior in accord with realist predictions is
normatively desirable for legal decision-makers setting private international
law. 75 In any event, there is nothing particularly legal about the political impo-
sitions-noting their presence as potential costs of sovereignty suffices.
72 See, e.g., Trimble supra note 37, at 706-07.
73 In the legal literature, see, for example, Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999) (arguing that customary
international law results merely from the coincidence of interests of the states involved and lacks
any further binding authority, for example, moral); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral
and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEG. STUD.
115, 115 (2002) (replying to arguments that states' use of moral and legal rhetoric is evidence to
the contrary); Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1901, 1902 (2003) (no). Compare Jack L. Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and
Constitutional Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1667 (2003) (the design of liberal democracies
makes it difficult to sacrifice national welfare), with Casey B. Mulligan, Ricard Gil & Xavier
Sala-i-Martin, Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 51, 52 (2004) ("democratic institutions have important effects on the degree of
competition for public office, but otherwise have effects on public policies that are insignificant").
74 Cf Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 35, 35-38 (1981) (carving law off from the "big picture" disciplines of moral philosophy and
that branch of it which passes under the name of normative economics); Goodman & Jinks, supra
note 10, at 1752-53 (global legal norms shape state behavior). I think the argument of Goodman
and Jinks is more plausible in the context of juridical than of political sanctions, since pragmatics
will generally be clearer in the latter than in the former.
75 Again, however, I should emphasize that I take no position on the substantive ends that
ought to underlie a state's law, whereas some forms of international-relations realism take or
recommend that those ends be the maximization of a state's "power" or international influence.
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IV. NATIONALISM APPLIED
This Part identifies four paradigm positions that a nationalist state might
adopt in setting its private international law of jurisdiction and choice of law.
For each such position, it identifies examples of actual states that have adopted
similar positions in specific doctrinal areas. The aim is to give a sense of na-
tionalism's application, although still at a high level of generality. Specific doc-
trinal applications must await further work in the field.
A. Scales of Sovereignty
The most obvious way in which states can economize on costs of sover-
eignty is by exercising less of it. Private international law governs the degree to
which a state yields sovereignty in light of the Fact of Overlap. States' settings
of private international law can be placed along a scale of sovereignty stretching
from complete abdication of adjudicative functions (an abandonment of any
claim to the right to set the rules, regardless of whether state ends would thereby
be advanced) to a complete assumption of legislative functions (a claim to the
right to set the rules under all circumstances).
More precisely, a state's private international law is an object in an ab-
stract, multidimensional sovereignty space.76 The multiple dimensions represent
different aspects of private international law, for example, jurisdiction, choice of
law, and the enforcement of judgments, or the sets of facts on which these three
depend. Each dimension is a scale with many possible values. A choice-of-law
rule might point to a foreign state's rule, some commonly developed substantive
law, a domestic law specially tailored to compromise ordinary domestic objec-
tives somewhat in light of the regulatory interests of other states,77 or simply the
ordinary rule applied in entirely domestic cases. Similarly, a jurisdictional rule
might assign a case to a foreign court, to some international or private tribunal,
or to domestic courts; and all of the above might be exclusive or available by
My normative framework transcends the issue of what ends a state ought to pursue and of what
ends ought to underlie its law.
76 Sovereignty space is similar to the law space of Davids Johnson and Post. See David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367, 1368 (1995). They write:
There has until now been a general correspondence between borders drawn in
physical space (between nation states or other political entities) and borders in
"law space." For example, if we were to superimpose a "law map" (delineat-
ing areas where different rules apply to particular behaviors) onto a political
map of the world, the two maps would overlap to a significant degree, with
clusters of homogeneous applicable law and legal institutions fitting within
existing physical borders.
Id.
77 See von Mehren, supra note 45, at 347.
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election of the parties. In general, the more numerous are the dimensions neces-
sary to fully represent a state's private international law, the more particularistic
are its determinations as to when a state should make claims to sovereignty.
Nationalist legal decision-makers set private-international-law rules so
as best to attain the ends justifying the law of the state they serve, keeping in
mind that regulation of conduct in which other states are interested may result in
costs of sovereignty. The following Subparts identify four paradigm positions,
objects in sovereignty space that a nationalist legal decision-maker might adopt.
For each such position, they identify considerations that might move a national-
ist legal decision-maker to adopt it and situations in which actual states have
adopted similar positions. I obtain the paradigm positions by moving along the
dimensions of jurisdiction and choice of law. Occasionally this obscures the
distinct positions a legal decision-maker might adopt by extending or limiting
claims to sovereignty along other dimensions of sovereignty space.
B. Domestic Jurisdiction and Domestic Law
Least internationalist of the paradigm positions is a claim to domestic
jurisdiction and the application of domestic law. The actual severity of this type
of claim depends on how vigorously it is enforced. Least severe is simply to
accept jurisdiction when cases come before the court and to apply domestic law
in those cases. More severe is to refuse to enforce foreign judgments on the
ground that foreign courts lack jurisdiction or to refuse to enforce those judg-
ments to the degree that they differ from those that would result under domestic
law. Still more severe is to enjoin, at the instance of a party, the pursuit of for-
eign legal remedies, with the injunction backed up by fines or criminal penalties.
Most severe is to criminalize the pursuit by any person of foreign legal reme-
dies, with enforcement by the normal criminal complex-in the United States,
police, district attorneys, grand juries, criminal trials and prisons.
More severe domestic-jurisdiction, domestic-law positions cross the line
into public international law. The American invasion of Iraq in response to its
imposition of costs of wrong law (failure to deter terrorist groups, say by penal-
ties, indoctrination, or education) is an extreme example of a claim to domestic
jurisdiction and domestic law. Another example is the American Servicemem-
bers' Protection Act of 2002 (ASPA),78 which adopts a fairly stiff domestic-
jurisdiction, domestic-law position as against the International Criminal Court
(ICC). 79 The congressional findings in ASPA declare that "[tihe United States
will not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over
78 American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7433 (2002).
79 On the recent opposition of the United States to the International Criminal Court, see gener-
ally, Allison M. Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the International Crimi-
nal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (2003).
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United States nationals,"8 0 that "[m]embers of the Armed Forces of the United
States should be free from the risk of prosecution by the International Criminal
Court," 8 1 and that "[t]he United States Government has an obligation to protect
the members of its Armed Forces, to the maximum extent possible, against
,,81a2ncriminal prosecutions carried out by the International Criminal Court. To
back up this claim, ASPA bars any "agency or entity of the United States Gov-
ernment or of any State or local government, including any court"8 3 from,
among other things, cooperating with formal ICC requests for cooperation,
84
extraditing persons to the ICC for trial, 85 sharing certain classified information
with the ICC, 86 and using congressionally appropriated funds to support the
ICC. Further, ASPA forbids the participation of American troops in United
Nations peacekeeping operations without guarantees that they will not be sub-
ject to ICC jurisdiction, prohibits American military assistance to states par-
ticipating in the ICC (with exceptions for certain allies),89 and authorizes the use
of "all means necessary and appropriate" to recover Americans subjected to ICC
jurisdiction.
90
Still another example of an area in which states make claims to domes-
tic jurisdiction and domestic law is the recognition of marriages for purpose of
civil benefits, criminal prohibitions (e.g. on bigamy or adultery), and divorce.
91
In the United States, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 92 has been interpreted toafford states virtual carte blanche in declining to recognize foreign marriages as
80 American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 899 § 2002(11).
81 -d at § 2002(8).
82 Id.
83 22 U.S.C. § 7423(e). Other provisions use slightly different language, but the differences
are minor for our purposes here.
84 Id. at § 7423(b).
85 Id. at § 7423(d).
86 Id. at § 7425(a).
87 id. at § 7423(f).
88 Id at § 7424. There is an exception for participation certified by the President as in "the
national interests of the United States." Id. at § 7424(b)-(c).
89 Id. at § 7426(b).
90 Id. at § 7427.
91 On these incidents of marriage, see, for example, Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802
N.E.2d 565, 565 (Mass. 2004) (Cordy, J.) (advisory opinion on legislative proposal of civil unions
in response to Goodridge v. Dep 't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-50 (Mass. 2003) (denying
marriage to same-sex couples violates Massachusetts constitution)).
92 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1.
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contrary to public policy.93 The recent authorization by Vermont of same-sex
civil unions94 and the recent decisions by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts requiring that state to permit same-sex marriages 95 are placing new
pressure on the use of public policy to deny recognition of foreign marriages
valid where entered into.
Over 35 states have passed Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs) an-
nouncing their intent not to recognize foreign same-sex marriages. 96 Courts in
Georgia 97 and Connecticut, 98 interpreting the body of their state law pertaining
to marriage, have denied recognition to Vermont same-sex domestic partner-
ships on public-policy grounds. 99 It is likely that the DOMA states will follow
suit and unlikely that there will be any constitutional bar to their so doing.
(Even if there were a constitutional bar, what I am interested in here is a state's
adoption of a domestic-jurisdiction, domestic-law policy, not the acceptability
of that policy under federal or other higher standards.) States have often refused
to recognize immoral-polygamous, incestuous, juvenile, &c.-marriages.1
00
93 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 717 (1988); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 302 (1981); Jack L.
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHi. L. REv. 1199 (1998) ("In practice, this standard is
notoriously easy to satisfy."). It is important to distinguish the choice-of-law issue (whether to
recognize as married a couple married elsewhere) from the enforcement-of-judgments issue
(whether to honor a foreign judgment premised on a couple's marriage). States are not permitted
to decline enforcement of judgments as contrary to public policy under the federal statute imple-
menting the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See generally Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Import-
ing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REV.
1235 (including a discussion of these and other cases).
94 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2004) (authorizing same-sex civil unions); Baker v. State,
744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (requiring an accommodation for same-sex couples).
95 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948-50; Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d
565 (Mass. 2004) (holding same-sex civil unions insufficient).
96 These are modeled on the federal DOMA, passed in response to Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (state failure to recognize same-sex marriages was sex discrimination under
state constitution) (mooted by HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (2003) limiting marriage to opposite sex
couples). The federal DOMA provides that "[n]o State ... shall be required to give effect to any
public act, record, or judicial proceeding ... respecting a relationship between persons of the same
sex that is treated as a marriage .... 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004).
97 Bums v. Bums, 560 S.E.2d 47, 47-49 (Ga. App. 2002); see also Katie Eyer, Related Within
the Second Degree? Bums v. Burns and the Potential Benefits of Civil Union Status, 20 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 297 (2002) (commenting on the then-pending appeal in Burns).
98 Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170, 170-75 (Conn. App. 2002).
99 But see Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411,449 (N.Y. S.Ct. 2003) (same-sex
partner under Vermont civil-union statute was spouse for purposes of New York wrongful-death
statute; court reserved decision on spousal status for other purposes under New York law).
1o See generally Note, Developments in the Law: III. Constitutional Constraints on Interstate




Camara: Costs of Sovereignty
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The same-sex issue is merely the latest focus in a long tradition of state claims
to domestic jurisdiction and domestic law in this area of the law of persons. 101
A firm domestic-jurisdiction, domestic-law position often imposes the
greatest externalities of sovereignty on other states relative to the other para-
digm positions. When the United States undermines participation in the ICC, it
undermines the objectives of those states that want to see a regularized interna-
tional adjudication mechanism for war crimes. When Texas refuses to honor
Massachusetts' same-sex marriages, it undermines the objective of protecting




(Assuming, of course, that this is in fact an objective underlying the law of Mas-
sachusetts; that is, either that Goodridge made it that way, or that Goodridge
was correctly decided in a more traditional sense.)
It is sensible to adopt a domestic-jurisdiction, domestic-law position
only when the gain from so doing in terms of the advancement of the ends justi-
fying domestic law is great, or the ability of the other states affected to respond
is small. The first justification holds when the subject matter is very important
in terms of domestic objectives, and the alternative (deference to international or
foreign law or to an international or foreign dispute-resolution mechanism) is
quite different from the domestic rule. Some of the alternatives in the ICC and
same-sex marriage examples are easy to see: the United States could defer to the
ICC and Texas could recognize Massachusetts' same-sex marriages. But inter-
mediate alternatives are also possible: recognizing ICC jurisdiction for very
serious violations of international law (ius cogens or some further subset) and
recognizing Massachusetts same-sex marriages for some purposes (wrongful
death standing), but not others (divorce, alimony, adoption).
103
The less important is the subject and the less difference being obstinate
makes, the less is gained by so acting. Where fine gradations are possible,
claims to domestic jurisdiction and domestic law should generally be limited to
the areas most important to a state and in which its substantive stance is furthest
from those of other interested states.
C. International Jurisdiction and Domestic Law
The second paradigm position concedes jurisdiction to an international
body on condition or on the understanding that it will apply domestic law.
Again, this can be done with different levels of firmness. The international dis-
101 Cf Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405-07 (1857) (chattel slave not a United States citizen
for purposes of federal jurisdiction).
102 Cf Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, and
Kathleen M. Sullivan as Amici Curiae, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), 1994 U.S. Briefs
1039.
103 See, e.g., Langan,765 N.Y.S.2d at 449 (recognizing Vermont same-sex civil union for pur-
poses of New York wrongful-death statute).
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pute-resolution body might be the court of a foreign state, the court of a federal
entity with regulatory authority over other matters, or a genuinely international
court not attached to any federal entity with a more general purpose. The con-
straint of domestic law can vary in tightness, and the mode by which that con-
straint is enforced can vary in severity. The domestic-law constraint would be
very tight if the dispute-resolution body were tied to explicit, authoritative dec-
larations of domestic law made by domestic institutions. It would be less tight if
it were merely a requirement that the outcome not be an outrageous interpreta-
tion of domestic legal materials. The mode of enforcement would be less severe
if it were simply a practice or a matter of fidelity to federal or international law
on the part of the dispute-resolution body. It would be more severe if it in-
volved the nullification by domestic institutions of decisions falsely purporting
to apply domestic law. The greater the stringency with which such a nullifica-
tion procedure is applied, the less the degree in fact of the jurisdictional delega-
tion to the international dispute-resolution body. In the limit, domestic institu-
tions would simply be engaging in plenary review.
The American law of federalism presents some nice examples of states
taking a position like this on the scale of sovereignty. Consider the authority of
the federal courts under Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins. 104 Erie holds that the
grant of diversity jurisdiction, unlike, say, the grant of jurisdiction over suits
between states, is not a grant of federal common-lawmaking power.10 5 In the
absence of that power, federal courts must turn to state law for rules of decision.
The constitution so-interpreted is a decision by states (albeit one bundled with
the decision to accept a variety of other rights and responsibilities as against
other states) to cede jurisdiction in certain cases in which nonstate jurisdiction
might be thought desirable, without also ceding their right to determine the ap-
plicable regulatory rules. This reservation is strengthened by the doctrine of
Murdock v. City of Memphis,106 which obliges the federal courts to obey au-
thoritative state constructions of state law rather than construing that law inde-
pendently. Murdock has the effect of tightening the constraint that the reserva-
tion by states of the right to set the law imposes on federal courts.
Weaker claims of international jurisdiction and domestic law are possi-
ble under the New York Convention. 07  The New York Convention obliges
parties to it to honor arbitral judgments rendered abroad, but preserves the ap-
plicability of domestic law with respect to arbitrability and when enforcement
104 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see generally Gasperini v. Cir. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996);
Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S.
525 (1958).
105 See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 881, 923-27 (1986) (setting out and defending this reading of Erie).
106 87 U.S. 590, 592 (1874).
107 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, New York, 1958.
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"would be contrary to... public policy."' 108 Although states such as the United
States have exercised this authority sparingly in recent years, 10 9 it does provide
room for them to take the position that arbitrations in certain subject areas will
be enforced only if undertaken in accordance with United States law. That
would be a claim to international jurisdiction and domestic law.
The United States has refused to enforce arbitral awards when the con-
tract to arbitrate is invalid under United States law (and the connection of the
parties to the United States justifies subjecting their contract to that law).
110
That is a delegation of international jurisdiction (to decide on the validity of the
contract), but only under domestic law (a restriction backed by denial of recog-
nition and enforcement). The larger are the areas subject to review for compli-
ance with domestic law, the closer a position of international jurisdiction and
domestic law slips toward one of domestic jurisdiction and domestic law.
An internationalist position on jurisdiction coupled with an insistence
on domestic law can be particularly useful when other states are more concerned
about the dispute-resolution institutions of a state than about its law, and when
the areas of domestic law on which the state wishes to insist are relatively nar-
row and do not require processes unique to domestic dispute-resolution institu-
tions. The first would be true when the concern of other states is with the parti-
ality of decision-making institutions-the old justification for diversity jurisdic-
tion; when the concern of other states is with the competence, sophistication, or
speed of decision-making institutions-the courts of third-world countries, or
notoriously slow Italy; or, more generally, when the concern is that dispute-
resolution institutions will not apply the law in force. I II The second would be
true when domestic issues are likely to arise as small parts of large cases: the
issue of the validity of an arbitration clause in a complex commercial arbitra-
tion, for example; it would not be true when domestic decision-making institu-
tions are charged with the protection of the interests of third parties, of whose
interests arbitrators who receive their business from the parties might be insuffi-
ciently protective-think of incompetent class members or the general public."12
108 Compare id. at Art. V § 2, with Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2004) (restricting
review of arbitral awards to procedural grounds, e.g., fraud, corruption, and exclusion of relevant
evidence).
109 See, e.g., Christine Davitz, U.S. Supreme Court Subordinates Enforcement of Regulatory
Statutes to Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: From the Bremen 's License to the Sky
Reefer's Edict, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59 (1997) (charting the Court's retreat from substan-
tive scrutiny of arbitral awards).
1o See generally J. Stewart McClendon, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United
States, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 58 (1982) (reviewing cases).
III This is aptly termed corruption or an agency cost of decision-making institutions.
112 A similar problem comes up in the context of preservation of issues for appellate review.
On one hand, declining to consider issues not preserved below encourages parties to clearly pre-
sent their contentions in district court. On the other hand, many legal rules are animated not only
by concern for the parties, who might then be said to have waved their entitlement to those rules
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D. Domestic Jurisdiction and International Law
The third paradigm position retains domestic jurisdiction, but concedes
the applicability of international law. Domestic jurisdiction might be available
at the election of the parties, or it might be exclusive of the jurisdiction of for-
eign and international dispute-resolution bodies. A claim to exclusivity can be
defended with various levels of ferocity, from a simple statement of exclusivity
to the refusal to enforce judgments rendered by other courts, to the issuance of
anti-suit and anti-anti-suit injunctions in defense of jurisdiction, or even to the
issuance of writs of prohibition directed at foreign courts and backed by the
threat of military enforcement. Similarly, a state can defer entirely or only par-
tially to international law, taking a broad or narrow view of. its contents, and
accepting all or only part of what it views as international law as trumping con-
trary domestic law. This can take the place of requiring good evidence of inter-
national law: formalized, written agreements as opposed to longstanding custom
proven by past statements of officials, diplomatic correspondence, and the
like. 113
Domestic-jurisdiction, international-law positions are common: for ex-
ample, the United States' rejection of the International Criminal Court coupled
with its acceptance of its own Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 114 which author-
izes the application of central norms of international law (ius cogens) by domes-
tic courts, amounts, with respect to those central norms, to a concession of the
applicability of international law conditioned by a refusal to entrust application
of that law to an international dispute-resolution body. There is considerable
controversy over how much of international law the ATCA makes applicable in
the federal courts. Some argue for a restrained view, restricting it to interna-
tional law at the time of the ATCA's passage or current ius cogens, while others
argue for an interpretation so broad as to encompass what are ordinarily thought
of as purely domestic crimes or the mere taking advantage of a state's particu-
larly loose labor-law regime. 116 The narrower is the interpretation of intema-
by not pressing them below, but also by concern for nonparties who had no control over the
lower-court litigation.
113 See generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, supra note 28 (critiquing traditional approaches and urging a narrower view).
114 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
115 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see generally Courtney Shaw,
Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REv.
1359 (2002) (providing a crisp walk-through of the principal ATCA precedents).
116 See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L.
1 (1990); Steve Kuan, Alien Tort Claims Act-Classifying Peacetime Rape as an International
Human Rights Violation, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 451 (2000) (arguing that ATCA should cover rape);
Joshua Ratner, Back to the Future: Why a Return to the Approach of the Filartiga Court is Essen-
tial to Preserve the Legitimacy and Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 83 (2002) (setting out the debate, including citations to cases taking narrower views, and
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tional law, the less is the difference between an international law and a domes-
tic-law claim.
Uniform laws such as the Uniform Commercial Code or preemptive
federal trademark law are even more common examples of domestic-
jurisdiction, international-law positions. When a state agrees to abide by such
international legal norms even though they deviate from what it would adopt in
the absence of the Fact of Overlap, it is making a concession along the choice-
of-law scale in favor of international law. Similarly, when a state consents to an
international agreement that imposes substantive legal requirements, either by
signing or by declining to withdraw from such an agreement, it adopts a domes-
tic-jurisdiction, international-law position.
This sort of position is particularly useful when the factors justifying an
international-jurisdiction, domestic-law position are reversed. For example,
when the state's principal concern is not with the applicability of international
norms, but rather with bias or procedural unfairness in their application by an
international tribunal, it economizes on sovereignty by insisting on domestic
jurisdiction but not domestic law. Similarly, in circumstances where it would be
highly disruptive for parties, witnesses, or evidence to travel to a distant juris-
diction with a significant interest in having its law applied, a state might ac-
commodate these conflicting interests by claiming jurisdiction domestically, but
applying the rule of decision of the distant jurisdiction. If the substantive areas
in which a state wants to defer to international law are likely to arise in combi-
nation with areas in which it wants to insist on domestic law, and if it is better at
defining these areas than are international dispute-resolution bodies, that too
would be a justification for a domestic-jurisdiction, international-law position.
E. International Jurisdiction and International Law
Most internationalist of the paradigm positions is the position that con-
cedes international jurisdiction and the applicability of international law. At its
most absolute, it would be a complete abdication of regulatory authority-of
sovereignty-in a particular subject area. Such a position can be moderated by
increasing the level of domestic scrutiny afforded the international dispute-
resolution body's decision that a particular dispute falls within its jurisdiction;
arguing for a broad view); Joanna E. Arlow, Note, The Utility of A TCA and the "Law of Nations"
in Environmental Torts Litigation: Jota v. Texaco, Inc. and Large Scale Environmental Destruc-
tion, 7 Wis. ENVT'L. L.J. 93 (2000) (arguing that ATCA should cover certain environmentally
harmful conduct); Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be
Held Liable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 927 (1998) (arguing for a broad view). The most restrained view is that ATCA provides no
cause of action at all; rather, Congress must specifically provide causes of action for violations of
international law, e.g. Torture Victim Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004) (creating cause of
action for state authorized "torture or extrajudicial killing"). See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 37, at 356-68.
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or by confining the scope in which the international body is free to select the
applicable law. That is, the acceptance of international law may be conditional
on that law falling within certain parameters, truly outrageous international law
remaining unaccepted. The stricter are these constraints on the scope of delega-
tion, the closer is a particular international-jurisdiction, international-law posi-
tion to one of the earlier paradigms.
Full-scale internationalist concessions often depart the doctrinal realm
of private international law and become reclassified as issues of federalism. The
recognition by American states of the Supreme Court's authority, indeed the
authority of the entire federal judiciary, to promulgate and apply federal law, is
an example of an international-jurisdiction, international-law position. It is
helpful to remember that this authority has not been taken for granted at all
times in American history. 1 7 Consider Southern states' initial outright refusalS 118
to recognize Northern assaults on slavery and, later, segregation. Controver-
sial decisions of the European Court of Justice and of the European Court of
Human Rights illustrate the similar international-jurisdiction, international-law
positions adopted by member states of the European Union. The World Trade
Organization's Dispute Resolution Body, and the Administrative Panels con-
vened pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Protocol
(UDRP) are smaller-scale examples of similar delegations. Additionally, full-
117 "The U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") duly noted, had helped to
nationalize American politics by gradually negotiating away key aspects of the sovereignty of the
American states." Kersch, supra note 27, at 5; see, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (permitting Congress to apply wage-and-hour restrictions of the Fed-
eral Labor Standards Act to state officers); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Congress
may regulate intrastate economic activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce here, growing wheat for domestic consumption.). But see United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (striking down Violence Against Women Act as beyond
commerce power); Alden v. Maine., 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) (state sovereign immunity
applies in state court); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (Kennedy, J.) (sover-
eign immunity bars even prospective relief affecting critical aspect of state sovereignty-here,
sovereignty over certain lands); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Kennedy, J.) (un-
der § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, enforcement legislation must be congruent to the constitu-
tionally guaranteed right and proportional to the violations of that right by the states); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (Congress may not commandeer officers of state
executive to enforce federal law-here, background-check provisions from Brady Handgun Vio-
lence Prevention Act); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (Con-
gress may not abrogate sovereign immunity using its commerce power); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (striking down Gun-Free School Zones Act as beyond
commerce power); N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) (Congress may not
compel state legislature or other lawmaking body to enact federal regulation, here taking title to
certain radioactive waste).
fig Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). "[T]his case ... raises questions of the highest impor-
tance .... It necessarily involves a claim by the Governor and Legislature of a State that there is
no duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court's considered interpreta-
tion of the United States Constitution. We reject these contentions." Id Under the duress of supe-
rior forces-the federal military Arkansas and the rest of the Southern states again conceded
jurisdiction and lawmaking authority in this area to the federal courts.
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scale internationalist concessions may be so longstanding as to feel inevitable:
for example, a state's decision not to interfere with another state's resolution of
purely domestic disputes despite the first state's generalized interest in doing
justice. 119
An international-jurisdiction, international-law position is desirable
when other states are very interested in regulating certain conduct and likely to
back that interest up in ways that would be particularly harmful. Threats of
military force, as in the case of disobedient American states, or their absence, as
in the stance of the United States and Europe on military intervention to prevent
human-rights abuses in North Korea or China, often weigh heavily in the adop-
tion or rejection of full-scale internationalist positions.
V. OBJECTIONS TO NATIONALISM
Objections to nationalism come in three flavors. 2 ° First and most fre-
quently put are objections to the idea of the ends justifying domestic law, which
nationalism holds legal decision-makers ought to serve. Second and third are
two varieties of internationalism. The first of these argues that nationalism en-
courages judges to overlook important internationalist interests that would be
important even on a nationalist calculus, properly done. The second argues that
nationalism is unsound as a moral-philosophical matter; that its view of states
operating in a state of nature is unsound; that the moral duties of man to man
conduct to judges and other legal decision-makers through the political proc-
esses that authorize them to exercise power over others. This Part addresses
each of these three principal objections.
A. "The Ends Justifying Domestic Law"
Bartholomew, a friendly critic, might at this point interject, "I'm not
quite sure about this idea of 'the ends justifying domestic law.' I gather from
what you've said so far that they are something like the most coherent story that
can be told of the past institutional practice of the political system of which the
legal decision-maker is a part. Now that sounds nifty, but in reality the ends of
the law are many and conflicting. I suspect their resolution into 'the ends justi-
fying domestic law' is not possible and I am confident it is not something done
by judges deciding actual cases."
119 Such generalized interests are not at all uncommon. Consider the taste of many in the
United States and Western Europe for the avoidance of human-rights violations on nonstrategic
grounds in parts of the world no matter how distant or divorced from matters of immediate con-
cern, such as petroleum prices.
120 I am particularly indebted in this Part to participants in seminars at Harvard Law School,
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Judges deciding cases in which objectives conflict implicitly prioritize
or weigh those objectives against each other. Where policy A suggests outcome
X, but policies B and C suggest outcome Y, the judge's arrival at X implies that
A either is prioritized or else outweighs B and C. Because cases frequently in-
volve conflicting objectives, Bart's objection is not special to private interna-
tional law. In purely domestic cases, judges are obliged to assign weights, at
least implicitly, to competing policy considerations. Together, these competing
policies and their relative weights define a function that maps the policies in-
volved in fact situations to corresponding legal outcomes.
The justification of this law function depends on the justificatory institu-
tions-like legislatures, elections, filibusters, and life tenure-that support the
political processes from which these policies and their relative weights emerge.
This function, so justified, is what I mean by the ends justifying domestic law,
the attainment of which nationalist legal decision-makers, in private interna-
tional law and elsewhere, are duty-bound to maximize. 121
Nationalism demands of the legal decision-making system that it pursue
the ends justifying domestic law. Having each legal decision-maker independ-
ently work upward to a crisp statement of the ends justifying domestic law by
examining, prioritizing, and weighing conflicting policies; then take that crisp
statement and descend through successively more specific policies down to the
facts of the case to determine what outcome best advances the crisp statement
up top is not the best way for the legal decision-making system to do this. Lim-
its on the time, dedication, and intellectual capacity of actual legal decision-
makers make it more effective for the system if particular legal decision-makers
localize their efforts.
Judges might consider only the policies directly in play in the case at
bar and give weight to earlier resolutions of conflicts among policies rather than
undertake that work directly and thereby incur the risk of error such an effort
entails. 122 The judicial system might be set up such that fundamental conflicts
of policies, or conflicts discovered, by the failure of other legal decision-makers
consistently to resolve them, to be difficult to resolve, are decided by the best
interpreters or by legal decision-makers specializing in the unification, by priori-
tizing and weighing, of conflicting policies at a high level. When policies that
require swift, flexible, and ad hoc adjustment of outcomes are involved in the
121 In cases in which one or another policy controls, we can think of this function as a surface
lying in however-many-policies-there-are dimensional space. For example, when there are two
competing policies, the weighing or prioritizing of one against the other defines a line in two-
dimensional space that separates the points (policy balances) at which one policy wins out from
the points at which the other does. When the policies both contribute to an outcome, we get a
mapping from policy space to outcome objects in however-many-characteristics-there-are-of-
outcomes-dimensional outcome space.
122 In Professor Sunstein's words, it is not necessary that judges in every case make a complete
conceptual ascent, only that the legal system aim at what such an ascent would reveal. Cass Sun-
stein, supra note 34, at 786; see also Ronald Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment
on the Two-Level Theory of Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640, 646-47 (1964).
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conflict, the assignment of the resolution may be not to judges at all, but to offi-
cers of the executive: the president, his secretaries, generals and commission-
ers. t23  Nationalism as a statement of the ends legal decision-makers should
serve does not assume a particular structure of the legal decision-making sys-
tem. 124  Objections based on the incapacities of a particular structure are not
objections to nationalism.
"All well and good," Bartholomew might say, "but we know that in fact
it doesn't work that way. Statutes are not enacted as the best expression of past
institutional history blah blah blibbity blah; 125 rather, they reflect some balance
between the moneyed interests, popular movements, and legislators' oft-
overwhelmed senses of civic duty. Even if the various legal outputs of a state
can be woven together, even if they must, at least implicitly, be woven together
in deciding particular cases, if they are not meant to be woven together, then
why ought legal decision-makers, in private international law or elsewhere, con-
cern themselves with so doing?"
123 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 n.9 (2000) (citing con-
siderations of flexibility advanced by proponents of bill giving President authority over sanctions
against Burma); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The determination to grant (or
not grant) immunity can have significant implications for this country's relationship with other
nations. A court is ill-prepared to assess these implications and resolve the competing concerns
the Executive Branch is faced with in determining whether to immunize a head of state."); Spacil
v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[I]n the chess game that is diplomacy only the
executive has a view of the entire board and an understanding of the relationship between isolated
moves."); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 37, at 352; Trimble, supra note 37, at 706-07. Cf Lea
Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law:A Methodological and Constitu-
tional Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 20-21 (1987) (arguing judicial ineptitude at
considering "general concerns" such as comity).
124 The primacy of legislatures in a political system says nothing about the desirability of plac-
ing private-international-law decisions in their hands. We might accept that legislatures have
authority to identify the ends justifying domestic law-promoting competition with the antitrust
law or what not-and yet maintain that to determine how these ends are best advanced in the face
of the Fact of Overlap, the legislature is not the most competent institution. But see. Lea Bril-
mayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 468
(1985). Professor Brilmayer finds something upsetting about urging courts to defer to legisla-
tively defined ends while telling legislators how to set private international law. Oughtn't defer-
ence to encompass private international law too? This argument is not well put against national-
ism, however, because the binding nationalism requires of legal decision-makers to the ends justi-
fying law applies to all legal decision-makers, including legislators. Fidelity to law is not the
same as judicial restraint. But see Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Rela-
tions Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-600679 at 15 ("To [nationalism's critics], [nationalism's proponents]
merely serve up Federalist Society dogma up one level on the international plane, mainly on the
supposition that keeping things local, rather than international, and presidential, rather than Con-
gressional and judicial, will serve a particular political agenda."); Trimble, supra note 37, at 684
(nationalism may incidentally restrict the power of the judiciary).
125 Cf Inca Mummy Girl, 2 BUFFY THE VAMPIRE SLAYER 4 (1997) ("Slaying entails certain
sacrifices blah blab blibbity blab, l'm so stuffy give me a scone.").
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One answer with which I am sympathetic is that legal decision-makers
should concern themselves with the coherence of law because this coherence, or
at least the effort of the system toward it, provides some of the justificatory
force of law. Law binds, in part, because it is principled; because it is not the ad
hoc exercise of power, policy A winning here against B and C not because of
priority or weight attached to it itself, but merely because of priority or weight
attached to it here, in this case, by this decision-maker. 126 Stated this way, co-
herence is part of the rule of law: the independence of the judgments, the trade-
offs, made by the law from certain situational features like the identities of the
decision-maker or the parties, their wealth, or their present popularity. The
search for legal coherence-for the ends justifying domestic law-is thus a con-
tribution of legal decision-makers to the justification of law; a part of their com-
petitive strategy against other normative sources, like economics, media, the
church, and the charismatic leader.127
Further along this line is the point that what Congress ought to do is in-
dependent of what it actually does. That legislators often err, succumbing to
the moneyed interests or to the manufacturers of popular hysteria, is no objec-
tion to the normative claim that they ought to be maximizing the attainment of
the ends justifying domestic law. It does raise the question, however, how sub-
sidiary legal decision-makers ought to treat norms generated by processes other
than pursuit of the ends justifying domestic law: the question, is extraconstitu-
tional law unconstitutional? One response is to declare extraconstitutional law,
law not motivated by coherent considerations, unconstitutional forthrightly.
Another is to minimize the effect of that law, for example as "in derogation of
the common law," or in silence; and yet another is to take what the law actually
does, the words of the enactment, and to include them as though they were the
sincere product of a search for the ends justifying domestic law, to treat them as
evidence of those ends. On the premise that legislators mainly err, the last is a
noble lie. Subsidiary legal decision-makers might accept it for the justificatory
power it lends the law. To trump outright legislative statements on the grounds
of their motivation by the moneyed interests, popular hysteria or simple horse-
trading might undermine too much the (illusion, myth, or perception of) democ-
racy on which subsidiary legal decision-makers rely.
A second response is more forgiving of the legislative behavior that so
upsets Bartholomew. The justificatory force of law may lie not in the compli-
cated preservation of an illusion that legal decision-makers strive for coherence,
but rather in the ability of all sorts of people, all sorts of policies, now and again
to have the benefit of an ad hoc decision. The system in any particular case isn't
fair, but on balance it all works out. In performing the prioritizing and balanc-
126 Cf Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689
(1984).
127 1 thank Charles Nesson for the notion of competition among normative sources.
128 Some might say, "Too often, vice versa."
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ing of conflicting policies, instead of the overriding policy of coherence, there is
the overriding policy of fundamental fairness in the process. But substituting
even distribution of ad hoc outcomes for reflection of a coherent system in each
individual case doesn't undermine the concept of the ends justifying domestic
law. The difference is simply that what would have appeared to be inconsistent
outcomes between policies in different cases on the coherence view are, on this
view, consistent because of the addition of the further policy in back. of even
distribution of ad hoc outcomes.
The essential point is this: the weight bome by the concept of the ends
justifying domestic law is light. Its role is simply to distinguish the output of the
domestic political system, to which nationalism asserts legal decision-makers
owe exclusive fidelity, from the output of other normative sources, most impor-
tantly the output of foreign political systems. 129 A wide variety of things can
serve as "the output of the domestic political system" without undermining the
distinction between that and "the output of foreign political systems." Further
precision is not necessary for the argument in favor of nationalist theories, al-
though some theory of how to discover the output of the domestic political sys-
tem is necessary to put a particular nationalist theory into practice.
Bartholomew, never at a loss for words, however, might press on: "That
sounds a little fishy, but I'm willing to accept that there's something different
between domestic and foreign ends. Often, however, domestic ends include
foreign-oriented behavior: sending AIDS drugs to Africa or ensuring that Chi-
nese peasants don't starve. Doesn't nationalism foreclose these ends?"
No, it does not. To the extent that internationalist concessions are
among the ends or are rightly derived from the ends justifying domestic law,
nationalism commands that legal decision-makers pursue them. Nationalism's
quarrel is with the judge who writes, "After a careful survey of our law and in-
stitutional practice, I conclude that the ends justifying our antitrust laws mandate
their application extraterritorially to this case; but such application would invade
the sovereignty of another state, which we lack power to do," not with the judge
who honestly concludes, "After a careful survey of our law and institutional
practice, which manifests a concern for the freedom of other nations to regulate
themselves, I conclude that although some of the ends justifying our antitrust
laws suggest their application extraterritorially in this case, on balance those
ends mandate restraint." 130 Neither does nationalism have a quarrel with per-
sons who agree that the ends justifying domestic law do not presently warrant
129 Professor Dworkin's critique of the assumption of a function for law, for example, is not
apposite against nationalism because its use here is only to distinguish national ends from foreign
ends; not to aid legal decision-makers in determining those national ends. See Dworkin, supra
note 122, at 644.
130 Nationalism does not merely require legal decision-makers or opposing commentators to
state their conclusions using magic language. There is a difference between according interna-
tionalist concessions the weight they deserve as a domestic matter, and according them independ-
ent weight as against the whole sum of domestic interests.
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certain internationalist concessions but argue that those ends ought to be differ-
ent. Nationalism has nothing to say about what the ends justifying domestic law
should be; it merely insists that there are not other, trumping ends in private
international law. 
13'
Some of the traditional private-international-law policies are more likely
to be included in the ends justifying domestic law than others: think of predict-
ability as against global welfare maximization. If global welfare maximization
were the end justifying domestic law, we would expect to see it manifested not
only in private international law, but also in antitrust and intellectual property.
32
Still, the forthright arguer for change might justify treating private international
law as though internationalist trumping ends did exist with an argument that
change in the whole of the law should begin with private international law. Ar-
guments for this view based on the low profile of private international law-
"let's meddle here because we can get away with it"-seem ungentlemanly.
B. Second-Order Internationalism
"Perhaps in theory it all works out," Bartholomew might continue, "but
in practice, if you hook judges and other legal decision-makers on nationalism,
they will refuse to make internationalist concessions that would be justified on
your 'enlightened' nationalist theory. Before refusing to make an international-
ist concession, an enlightened nationalist would consider the possibility of recip-
rocity, for example a reciprocal withholding of jurisdiction in a case where the
dominant interests are reversed; of reciprocity in other areas, for example coop-
eration in disclosure of bank holdings in exchange for cooperation in extradition
of war criminals; and of reciprocity in unforeseen areas, for example coopera-
tion in antitrust investigations in exchange for flyover permission granted in the
wake of a terrorist attack sometime in the future. An enlightened nationalist
would consider the benefits of an international rule of law, under which conces-
sions are made according to rules, not the shifting power of competing states.
1 33
"Where a current concession is exchanged for the expectation of future
reciprocity, a regime of mutual trust and credible commitment may develop to
131 See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 30, at 844, 857-
59, 868, 874 (complaining about the elevation of norms with extraconstitutional origins, to the
detriment of domestic law and domestic political institutions).
132 On my broad definition of private international law, those aspects of antitrust and intellec-
tual property that intrude on the regulatory interests of other states are within private international
law. But other commentators do not use so broad a definition. Consequently, when a theory is
offered for, say, choice of law only, we may rightly ask why only choice of law and not the as-
pects of private international law more often treated under substantive headings.
133 "Indeed, one might .. plausibly urge that the prevalence of force-even the threat that it
might be used, for whatever reason-makes for international instability, which generally discour-
ages the observance of international law. On the other hand, if force is unavailable, there may be
greater disposition to pursue consensus, to develop and maintain law." HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE, supra note 55, at 163-64.
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the advantage of many. More than that," Bartholomew might say, "your
enlightened nationalist would realize that internationalist concessions could fa-
cilitate a beneficial exchange of ideas, a sounder understanding of the policies
and interests underlying foreign law, and so a firmer basis for cooperation or
even a reconsideration of the ends justifying domestic law. Indeed, enlightened
nationalism doesn't seem so different from internationalism. Perhaps coopera-
tion in private international law is necessar scaffolding, a first step toward
greater cooperation or political unification. These are things the enlightened
nationalist would consider."
"The trouble," Bartholomew might insist, "is that actual legal decision-
makers are unavoidably immersed in the domestic legal system. Their absorp-
tion of its ends, of its perspective, clouds their view of the benefits of interna-
tionalism and makes them unduly stingy in their internationalist conces-
sions."
13 5
First, it is not clear that the bias of legal decision-makers is nationalist
rather than internationalist. 3 6 On one hand, there is the cultural immersion Bar-
tholomew identifies; but on the other, there is the insulation of many legal deci-
sion-makers--consider United States federal judges-from direct political pres-
sure. 137 Further, great academic energy is devoted to encouraging legal deci-
134 Cf Nev. v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 427 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's basic
and undeniable ruling is that what we have always thought of as a 'sovereign State' is now to be
treated in the courts of a sister State, once jurisdiction is obtained, just as any other litigant. I fear
the ultimate consequences of that holding, and I suspect that the Court has opened the door to
avenues of liability and interstate retaliation that will prove unsettling and upsetting for our federal
system.")
135 See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 123, at 19 (arguing benefits of sovereignty more apparent to
judges than costs, in international context); Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Leg-
islative Intent, 78 MicH. L. REV. 392, 411 (1979) (arguing for consideration of "system-
coordinating values"). As Professor Henkin described British decision-making in the Suez canal
incident, "The other 'costs,' e.g., 'world opinion,' the effect on order and stability and on the
influence of law, if considered, were probably too intangible and too indeterminate to be given
much weight." HENKIN, How NATIoNs BEHAVE, supra note 55, at 255 n. t.
It involves some faith to insist that every violation damages the total structure
to the detriment of all, or that in a particular case the specific advantages of
violation are less weighty than incalculable costs, and the immediate benefits
less important than eventual loss. Attitudes which see law observance as be-
ing in opposition to national interest inevitably discourage policy-makers from
including in the balance any but patent and immediate interests. The policy-
maker is even reluctant to consider law observance at some immediate cost if
he sees himself as 'sacrificing national interest' to some legal obligation.
Id. at 332.
136 Compare Goldsmith, supra note 28 (the design of liberal democracies makes it difficult to
sacrifice national welfare), with Mulligan et al., supra note 28, at 52 (2004) ("democratic institu-
tions have important effects on the degree of competition for public office, but otherwise have
effects on public policies that are insignificant").
137 As Professor Henkin writes:
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sion-makers to make internationalist concessions for internationalist reasons.
Legal decision-makers are not immune to educational and social pressures im-
posed by their intellectual peer groups. If the commentary to which legal deci-
sion-makers are exposed is biased in favor of internationalism that is a further
reason to fear excessive concessions. The magnitude and direction of bias no
doubt depend on the particular legal decision-maker in question-judges will
have different biases than ambassadors eager to reach a deal or senators facing
an upcoming election.
In any event, an opponent of nationalism who has slipped to Bartholo-
mew's present argument has already made the most important concession. Bar-
tholomew no longer disputes that the legal decision-making system ought, in
private international law as elsewhere, to pursue the ends justifying domestic
law. He is merely saying that the best way to do this may be to trick certain
legal decision-makers into thinking an internationalist theory is correct so as to
counter their bias against internationalist concessions. Bartholomew has re-
treated to second-order internationalism, conceding nationalism along the way.
C. First-Order Internationalism
Aghast, Bartholomew might object, "No, no, I'm hardly conceding that.
My objection to nationalism is deeper than an argument about the bias of deci-
sion-makers: nationalism is morally bankrupt and in a way that reveals a gross
internal inconsistency. Legal decision-makers' obligation to advance the ends
justifying domestic law rests on the justificatory characteristics of the political
system in place; that is, on the rightness of its rule of recognition or the legiti-
macy of its constitution. Nationalism therefore recognizes that citizens of the
same state have political-philosophic claims against one another, for example
that a law not be applied into which each did not have an opportunity for formal
input."
Every day, legal counsel suppress or modify proposals that are deemed illegal
before they reach the level of decision; political officers themselves stifle or
fail even to think of measures which they know would probably be unlawful.
In the life of a foreign office it is not uncommon that officers responsible for
relations with Country X wish particularly that those relations remain friendly
and untroubled; 'desk officers' are even known to acquire special sympathies
for their 'clients.' They would hardly propose policy that would violate law
and roil relations, and would resist any such proposal by others. If a political
officer were tempted to propose a violation of a norm or treaty, it is highly
probable that the proposal would be sent to the office of the legal adviser for
clearance, and it would be stopped or modified there.
HENKIN, How NATIoNs BEHAvE, supra note 55, at 47. "Middle-level officers in foreign offices
assigned responsibility for activities of international organizations, and often particularly dedi-
cated to their ideals, recommend support for human rights measures." Id. at 238. One suspects
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"Nationalism holds, however, that these interpersonal political obliga-
tions end at the national border: while legal decision-makers' binding a citizen is
premised on justificatory characteristics of the political process, legal decision-
makers' binding an alien is not. If the need for the justificatory characteristics
of the political process in the domestic case has to do with something other than
citizenship, for instance simple personhood, then the line between citizen and
alien is arbitrary. My objection is that nationalism treats foreigners not merely
as noncitizens, but as nonpersons, or anyway as having inexplicably weaker
political-philosophic claims to respect than do citizens."
I agree with Bartholomew that nationalism requires a political-
philosophic foundation. 138 It is not itself a way of avoiding questions of that
sort; rather, it allows legal decision-makers operating after its adoption to avoid
questions of that sort, which are more likely to arise under an internationalist
regime. Its defense, therefore, requires at least some initial steps toward such a
foundation. 139  As for any moral-philosophic story, the acceptability of this
foundation is a matter of personal taste. All that can be done is to write for both
sides persuasively, identify consequences and analogies, and urge reflection in
the hope that agreement is reached.
Bartholomew's view, the internationalist view, imagines rights-bearing
units-people-that exist antecedently to states and owe political duties to each
other by virtue of their common status as people. These duties are not lost when
a subset of people band together and, putting in place justificatory political
processes, bind themselves together under law. Instead, on the internationalist
view, the duties owed by people to each other are conducted by the justificatory
political processes up to the legal decision-makers so empowered. Duties to
aliens are part of the justification for law's binding effect on aliens.1
40
The nationalist view has a different initial picture. Although it admits
the existence of duty-creating transactions such as taking something in use by
another or the accidental causing of harm to another, it views political duties as
created by the association of people one with another. When a subset of people
band together and put in place justificatory political processes to bind them-
138 That is, I agree with Professor Brilmayer that "the question must be phrased in" terms of
"what might count as an adequate justification" for the "exercise [of] coercive authority over [a
foreign] individual." Brilmayer, Interstate Federalism, supra note 7, at 972.
139 Kersch, supra note 27, at 13 ("It is hard not to conclude that many of the discussions of
these issues [increased reliance on international sources of law], in their fussing over narrow,
technical points, are either deliberately or in their effects, throwing a smokescreen over the pro-
found issues of constitutional self-government that, at bottom, are at stake. [S]hifts in emphasis..
. depend on whether the purpose of the [internationalist] argument is to rally the faithful or deflect
the opposition.")
140 See, e.g., Brilmayer, Interstate Federalism, supra note 7, at 972 ("1 realize that this way of
phrasing the issue leads inevitably into a natural law thicket. The relevant natural law precept is
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selves under law, there are no duties to nonmembers of the band (aliens) that
might conduct themselves up by virtue of the association's founding or the
state's constitution. The creation with others of a state, as against non-citizens,
is a duty-free transaction. "If I band with you, then I grant you, as part of the
deal, special protections against the coercive power of the band; but against oth-
ers, subject only to the individual-level moral obligations, the band is free to
act." This freedom of people from each other is an important basis of the na-
tionalist theory.
Another argument for the internationalist view relies on an analogy be-
tween duties created among citizens on the constitution of a state and duties, if
any, that exist among states so constituted. It is important at the outset to note
an important distinction between the case of cocitizenship within a state and the
case of coexistence of states. Many commentators have found appealing the
idea that individual merit, for example superior intelligence, strength, or birth, is
undeserved, so that its holder is not entitled merely for that reason to whatever
fruits it yields in the prevailing socioeconomic system. Differences in the rela-
tive power of states, however, may have to do with the quality of their political
processes or of the decisions arrived at through those processes, which may be
deserved in a way that individual merit is not. There is something odd to the
notion that the rights incident to sovereignty do not depend on who it is that
erects the new sovereign state and how they do the erecting. In sum, I take Bar-
tholomew's central point, that nationalism requires a moral-philosophic basis
just as much as internationalism does. I hope that the clear statement of the na-
tionalist view and this sketch of the responses to the moral-philosophic objec-
tions that leap immediately to mind suffices at least to establish nationalism as
plausible.
Before proceeding, however, we must deal with the problem of evil law,
which all theories that bind legal decision-makers to bodies of law must con-
front. The standard example in the literature is the judge in Nazi Germany, for
whom the correct thing to do is to not carry out Nazi atrocities. 141 Reams have
been spent on whether this is best called a limitation of Nazi law because of its
inconsistency with some higher law so that the judge when he does the right
thing is following law; or instead whether it is best to say the judge is violating
the law when he does the right thing. I prefer the latter. When a legal decision-
maker discovers that the ends justifying his law are evil, he may have a moral
obligation to the parties affected by his decision (or to some higher institution)
to decide otherwise than by law. Nationalism does not assert that the duty to
serve the ends justifying domestic law is absolute; merely that no weightier duty
arises simply from the Fact of Overlap.
141 The Hart-Fuller debate used this example. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1957); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1957).
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VI. CONNECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS
A. Positive Claims, State Structure, and the Theory of the Firm
Nationalism is a theory about how legal decision-makers ought to set
private international law. It would obviously be interesting, whatever one's
view of nationalism as an ideal, to see in what ways actual legal decision-
makers approach or deviate from nationalist prescriptions. Doing so is compli-
cated by the difficulty of measuring the incremental advancement of the ends
justifying a state's law resulting from a change in private international law, and
the costs likely to be imposed by other states on account of such changes-the
benefits and costs of sovereignty. Nevertheless, the broad outlines of national-
ism can be tested by focusing on major trends in the costs and benefits of sover-
eignty, or both, and seeing whether states make the expected increased or de-
creased claims to sovereignty.
As the frequency and intensity of conflicts between state regulatory in-
terests increases, often because technological change expands the geographic
impact of conduct, 142 the cost of regulating that conduct increases as well. And
if the benefit of regulation is local, it is unlikely to keep pace with this rising
cost. If legal decision-makers behave in accord with nationalism, we would
expect them to reduce claims to sovereignty in the face of such technological
change. The rise of the Internet has this effect on defamatory speech and the
business practices of firms selling to customers online; the internationalization
of capital flows has this effect on securities regulation and accounting rules; the
proliferation of destructive weaponry has this effect on education and indoctri-
nation.
Similarly, as the regulatory ends of states converge-as more and more
join the march to freedom-we should see a decrease in claims to sovereignty
because the benefits of such claims will have decreased. The growing body of
European substantive law should have this effect on the private international law
of member states, while the introduction of new and different member states
should have the opposite effect. Studies of these sorts of cost- or benefit-
altering events are likely the easiest way to test for nationalism in practice.
Also of interest is the connection between certain structures of a state
and its adherence to nationalism. Even if nationalism is accepted as an ideal,
there remains the problem of allocating authority within a state's lawmaking
structure so as to achieve a nationalist private international law. 143 The modem
142 See, e.g., David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent":
Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 1055, 1085-86 (1998).
143 This issue has appeared in the courts. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, for example, Mr.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, rejected as a rational basis for excluding aliens from the
federal civil service "that the broad exclusion may facilitate the President's negotiation of treaties
with foreign powers by enabling him to offer employment opportunities to citizens of a given
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corporate-law literature addresses the same basic problem: identifying the con-
trol mechanisms that best constrain directors to the pursuit of shareholder
wealth. 144  The private-international-law context highlights a lesson that has
only recently emerged in the corporate-law literature: that the types of incen-
tives that work, market-financial, social-moral-philosophic, or political, depend
on the relative levels of insulation of particular decision-makers from each type
of force.145 A theory of the optimal structure of the state is thus a theory of the
optimal deployment of insulation and force.
Finally, it is neat to notice a connection between nationalism and the
theory of the firm. Ronald Coase's theory of the firm holds that it expands until
the marginal cost of absorbing further factors of production and subjecting them
to internal control mechanisms equals the marginal cost of contracting for them
on the market.146 The existence of costs of contracting or transaction costs, and
costs of internal organization or agency costs results in an optimal size of the
firm. Similarly, in the private-international-law context, nationalism commands
states to extend their laws until the marginal costs of sovereignty equal the mar-
ginal foregone benefits of sovereignty (the cost of accepting a nondomestic
regulation of conduct). Costs and benefits of sovereignty lead to an optimal size
of the state in sovereignty space.
B. Sticky Sovereignty and Private-International-Law Technology
Sovereignty is sticky. In the course of regulating target conduct, a state
often winds up regulating sideswiped conduct as well. 147 This is undesirable for
the regulating state when regulation of target conduct alone better furthers the
ends justifying its law than would regulation of both target and sideswiped con-
duct. Other states might care more about regulation of sideswiped than target
foreign country in exchange for reciprocal concessions, an offer he could not make if those aliens
were already eligible for federal jobs." 426 U.S. 88, 104 (1976). The Court pierced the executive
veil, writing, "We may assume with the petitioners that if the Congress or the President had ex-
pressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the national interest in pro-
viding an incentive for aliens to become naturalized, or possibly even as providing the President
with an expendable token for treaty negotiating purposes; but we are not willing to presume that
the Chairman of the Civil Services Commission, or any of the other original defendants, was
deliberately fostering an interest so far removed from his normal responsibilities." Id. at 105.
144 See, e.g., K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law,
2004 Wisc. L. REV. 1425 (forthcoming 2004) (discussing existing control mechanisms and reply-
ing to proposals for reform).
145 See, e.g., K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. - (forthcom-
ing 2005) (discussing the three types of forces and the concept of insulation).
146 See e.g., Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (N.s.) 386 (1937).
147 The terminology is from Professor Charles Fried, who applies it in the context of constitu-
tional analysis, for example of regulation that targets speech versus regulation that merely side-
swipes speech on the way to some other end.
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conduct such that the marginal benefit of regulating sideswiped conduct is out-
weighed by the cost of retaliation expected from other states for so doing. Cases
like this feature a failure of private-international-law technology in that a state's
private international law cannot discriminate between target and sideswiped
conduct. If the state could so discriminate, there would be no problem of side-
swiped conduct being tied to target conduct because the state could regulate
target conduct alone. Because it cannot discriminate, the state must regulate
either both target and sideswiped conduct, or neither.
Consider a state that wants to protect its citizens from harmful speech,
say racist or anti-Semitic, on the Internet.' 4t If Internet technology is such
that the state can only prevent its citizens from accessing this speech by forc-
ing speech producers to shut down entirely, that is, if there is no way for
speech producers or no way to force speech producers to screen citizens
from aliens, then the state in question will be forced to decide between regu-
lating access to the speech everywhere, or not at all. If it chooses to regulate
at all, by hypothesis, it will shut down all production of the speech on the
Internet, 149 which might be bad from the perspective of other states that take
the harm caused by viewing the speech less seriously or find the interest in
free exchange concerning such matters more important. The regulating state
will be imposing a cost of wrong law, not as a penalty for anything, but sim-
ply incidentally to its regulation of speech reaching its citizens. A geo-
graphic filtering mechanism for Internet access 15 0 would alleviate this prob-
lem by allowing the state to frame its regulation as a mandate to use the fil-
tering mechanism, which would allow other states to regulate the access to
bad speech of their own citizens in whatever way they think best.
Or consider a state that finds jurisdiction very important in a particular
sort of case, say because it is highly disruptive for evidence and witnesses to be
displaced, but finds the application of its particular law not very important.
Think of an ordinary marriage or divorce.' 5  If other states feel strongly about
their law, it would often make sense for this state to strictly assert jurisdiction,
but to be at the same time quite flexible about applying the law of other states.
In this way, it would claim the aspect of sovereignty (advance the position of its
private international law along the dimension of sovereignty) most important to
148 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1204-05 (1998).
149 "Consider the Bavarian Justice Ministry's threat in December of 1995 to prosecute Compu-
Serve for carrying online discussion groups containing material that violated German antipor-
nography laws. CompuServe responded by blocking access to these discussion groups in Ger-
many. Because of the state of then-available technology, this action had the effect of blocking
access to these discussion groups for all CompuServe users worldwide." Id. at 1224.
150 My law-school classmate Mike Zarren is working on a practical method of doing this, for
example. See Michael Zarren (forthcoming 2004).
151 By ordinary, I simply mean not including any feature that is of strikingly high importance to
one of the states involved, for example, homosexual marriages to Texas or Massachusetts.
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it, while minimizing cost by yielding less important aspects of sovereignty to
other states. Sovereignty moves to its highest-valuing user.
This scheme fails, however, if the state claiming jurisdiction cannot ap-
ply the law of foreign states. Its family-law courts might be corrupt or incompe-
tent, or its judges and juries might infuse the conceptual apparatus of foreign
law with domestically determined meaning-what constitutes good cause for
divorce will vary across cultures. These features of the state's law-application
system mean that when it claims jurisdiction it necessarily claims a bit of choice
of law as well. A reform of its law-application system to increase its ability to
apply foreign law would allow it to make finer-grained claims to sovereignty.
It is sometimes useful to distinguish the type of absence of private-
international-law technology in the Internet hypothetical from that in the family-
law hypothetical. In the Internet hypothetical, there are chunks of fact-
chunkiness as a feature of the factual architecture; in the family-law hypotheti-
cal, there are chunks of law--chunkiness as a feature of the regulatory process.
Chunkiness can be desirable for states. It can allow a state to credibly
insist on regulating sideswiped conduct because of the admitted importance to
that state of regulating target conduct-chunkiness becomes an architectural
commitment device. A theory of the optimal private-international-law technol-
ogy would be an interesting extension of the nationalist analysis.
C. Camouflaged Sovereignty
States impose costs of sovereignty to deter other states from making ex-
cessive claims to sovereignty. To avoid the imposition of such costs, a state
must convince the imposing states that it is not the source of the regulation they
find offensive. One way it can do this is by decreasing its claims to sovereignty:
by regulating less. But another is by camouflaging its claims to sovereignty so
that other states see them as originating elsewhere or nowhere. If other states do
not associate claims to sovereignty they find excessive with the state in ques-
tion, then they will have no reason to impose costs of sovereignty on that state.
Camouflage operates in at least three ways. First, states can make
claims to sovereignty appear to be the inevitable consequences of the way the
world works-they can embed sovereignty. A state embeds sovereignty when it
disguises the limitation or facilitation of conduct desired as a feature of the fac-
tual architecture independent of its law. Consider a state that wants to ban holo-
caust denial everywhere. If it designs the Internet, or permits the design of the
Internet, in such a way that regulation of speech somewhere means regulation of
speech elsewhere because it is difficult or impossible to reliably condition ac-
cess on the geographic location or nationality of the user, 152 the claim to sover-
152 See, e.g., Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002)
(declining to base personal jurisdiction on the operation of a web site accessible in Michigan
because "[aln Internet website by its very nature can be accessed internationally") (emphasis
added); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997) ("While there is no
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eignty over holocaust denial outside its borders can seem an inevitable conse-
quence of its internal regulation. Part of the breadth of the state's speech regula-
tion is embedded in the architecture of the Internet. Similarly, by designing the
Internet to use or not to use personal identifications traceable to particular users,
a state can camouflage its regulatory preference for or against anonymity. The
trick of embedding is to hide claims to sovereignty within a factual architecture:
to make the limitations of the factual architecture appear proximately defined by
the world out there rather than by the state in question.
Second, states can tie claims to sovereignty to systems to which they are
attached-states can naturalize sovereignty. A state naturalizes sovereignty
when it attributes its insistence on a particular claim to sovereignty to a system
of which the claim is a part, which system the state is more credibly committed
to than it is to the particular claim in question. 153 In this way, minor rules ac-
quire the weight of the state's attachment to the system as a whole. The deci-
sion on particular rules is elevated to the level of the decision on the system as a
whole so that the state can purport not to have the power to tamper with particu-
lar rules. Adherence to a formalist private international law, for example a terri-
torial theory of choice of law, may be an example of camouflage by naturaliza-
tion. The trick of naturalization is to disguise claims to sovereignty as proxi-
mately dictated not by a state, but by some outside normative source binding on
and unalterable by the state.
154
Third, a state can allow other states or private institutions to act in ways
that have an effect similar to direct regulation-it can privatize sovereignty.
Take a state with ends that would be advanced by having a standard computer
operating system as the domestic norm. One way to do this would be to man-
date use of a domestically controlled operating system. Another would be to
allow a private company to succeed in the prevailing socioeconomic system in
such a way as to dominate the market for operating systems. The end result of
the two approaches is the same with respect to the attainment of the state's ends,
but the second approach can plausibly be said not to involve claims to sover-
eignty by the state itself. In fact, the state reaches its desired regulatory outcome
through the background rules of private law, which have a greater apolitical
naturalness to them than do direct regulatory mandates.
The ratio of private law to more obvious forms of regulation can de-
crease without wholly eliminating the camouflage value of private law. A less
question that anyone, anywhere could access the home page ... we cannot see how from that fact
alone it can be inferred that Cybersell deliberately directed its merchandising efforts toward Ari-
zona residents." This is, however, at most a case of Florida taking advantage of other authorities'
camouflaging behavior, since it is implausible to ascribe this aspect of the Internet architecture to
Florida.).
153 Cf MORTON HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1992) (also with respect
to the private-public distinction in the next text paragraph).
154 This can be viewed as creating the illusion of a precommitment device.
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dramatic way of privatizing is to delegate regulatory authority to a body with the
appearance of neutrality or internationality, but which is surrounded with con-
trol mechanisms that check divergences from domestic law. Instead of regulat-
ing Internet domain names directly, a state can pass the task to a purportedly
international agency while ensuring that the cultural, legal, and personal influ-
ences on that agency's decision-making are largely consistent with the state's
own ends.' 55 The supposedly internationalist institution is a means of legitimiz-
ing enhanced domestic claims to sovereignty. The trick of privatization is to
cleanse a state of regulatory agency by funneling regulation through a plausibly
independent decision-maker-a firm or international agency-or through a
plausibly independent decision-making mechanism-the market or democracy.
Cataloging the different forms of camouflage and getting a sense of the
prevalence of each in practice would be a worthwhile enterprise. That inquiry
would be complicated, however, because camouflaging behavior is motivated
only partly by a desire to camouflage claims to sovereignty. Microsoft might be
in place both to camouflage certain regulatory claims and because it operates
more efficiently than would a United States Department of Software Engineer-
ing. The idea of camouflage stresses the nationalist idea that concessions are
most effective along dimensions of private international law about which other
states care. Camouflage is both a tool for disguising a private-international-law
position, and for making dimensions of private international law less salient.
D. Private Sovereignty
Nationalism as so-far presented is a normative framework for states.
But a parallel theory can be similarly justified for institutions in general. Con-
sider a technology industry standards-setting board or a team organizing an in-
tercollegiate ballroom-dancing competition. An officer of either institution has
a duty to advance the interests of the institution as manifested in its official
statements and past practice. 156 Intrusions by the institution on matters in which
other institutions are interested ought then to be determined by comparing the
benefits of each intrusion in terms of advancement of institutional interests with
the costs of that intrusion in the same terms. For the standards-setting board,
relevant considerations include backward compatibility (roughly, consumers
preferring more and industry, all else equal, preferring less), interoperability
(with the standards of other groups), and fees or other value extraction (cross-
licensing agreements). For the ballroom-dancing team, relevant considerations
include the events offered (because training programs elsewhere are structured
155 See, e.g., Heifer, supra note 54.
156 Corporate officers have an obligation to maximize shareholder wealth, unless something
else is specified in the charter. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919); see generally Camara, supra note 145. But see Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Prof-
its in the Public Interest (working paper 2004). Charter specifications of a non-profit-maximizing
goal do exist, for example in the case of many incorporated newspaper companies.
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around events offered at competitions), step syllabi and level restrictions used
(increasing the field versus equalizing it), and scheduling (on top of or away
from other teams' events). There is a translation of nationalism from the case of
states to that of private institutions.
The interest of this observation lies in the light it sheds on resistance to
nationalism in the context of states. Private institutions generally operate
against the backdrop of a state with a mixture of facilitative and regulatory
laws in place. 157 Contract allows for credible commitment and makes repu-
tation less important, property allows a relaxation of institutional security,
and so forth. Such regulatory regimes alter the payoffs attached to the po-
tential strategies of institutions operating under them. A literal hostile take-
over-with guns blazing-of a competitor's manufacturing plant receives
not only what retaliatory sanctions the competitor can muster, but also the
surer and stiffer intervention of the state. Commentators' attachment to non-
strategic limits on sovereignty may be in part a carrying-over of what are
strategic considerations for institutional decision-makers operating in the
shadow of state force.
At the international level, this condition is equivalent to the existence of
a beneficent superpower enforcing a mix of facilitative and regulatory prac-
tices on all other states-the superpower as global policeman. A superpower
might assume such a role because, on balance, its ends are best achieved
through global law, because its ends are themselves the maintenance of
global law, or because its legal decision-makers act inconsistently with na-
tionalism. The expected actions of an agency on high possessed of inelucta-
ble force translate nicely into natural or higher-order law in the absence of
such an agent. Background conditions affect not only participants, but com-
mentators too.
E. The Federal Perspective
Private international law can be set by a state deciding on the scope of
its laws in the face of the Fact of Overlap-that is the perspective from which
nationalism has been so-far considered. But nationalism is equally applicable to
the case of a federal entity resolving regulatory conflicts between subsidiary
states. From the federal perspective, the institutional duty is to advance the ends
justifying federal law. The normal law-determining process yields for federal
law, just as it does for the law of an independent state, a set of ends; and federal
legal decision-makers are obliged to pursue those ends, just as state legal deci-
sion-makers are obliged to pursue state ends. What private international law
between subsidiary states best advances federal ends depends on the relationship
between state ends and federal ends. Consider nationalist subsidiary states-
157 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1979).
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states that act so as to maximize the attainment of their own ends. 158 If this be-
havior leads to results consistent with federal ends then there is no need for pri-
vate international law. There will be substantive agreement on the entire law
and so the Fact of Overlap, with which it is the province of private international
law to deal, will not obtain. Similarly, if federal ends do not include anything
substantive, but rather consist of maintaining a certain allocation of authority
among subsidiary states-self-determination-what appears as a formalist pri-
vate international law, for example a territorial theory, may be consistent with• • 159
nationalist prescriptions.
The interesting cases arise when federal and state ends fall between these
two extremes. Suppose that the federal entity and each subsidiary state aims
to maximize the wealth of its citizens. Each state objective function depends
positively and exclusively on the welfare of its citizens and the federal ob-
jective function is the same except that it is concerned with the citizens of
the nation as a whole. To the extent the citizens of each state differ in their
interests, occupations, and other characteristics, the outputs of state political
processes will differ as well.
Suppose that a state containing the full base of producers and consumers
in a particular market would have reason to enact the best antitrust laws for
regulation of that market. If the demographics of the federal organization
are such that producers are concentrated in one subsidiary state and consum-
ers in another, 16 the antitrust law of the producers' state will be biased to-
158 Criticizing Professor Currie, Professor Brilmayer notes that interest analysts sometimes rely
on their own determination of the ends justifying the law of a foreign state, rather than on the
judicial (or other official) pronouncements of that state. Lea Brilmayer, supra note 124, at 469.
Nationalist legal decision-makers are concerned with the potential reaction of foreign states.
Thus, if foreign states view their interests through a nonnationalist lens, for example if they claim
regulatory authority on a territorial or vested-rights theory, it is intrusions on those nonnationalist
claims that the nationalist state should be concerned with. It will sometimes be proper to discount
the pronouncements of a foreign state's judiciary or other authorized law-applying body when the
response to domestic claims to sovereignty is likely to come from a different organ of the foreign
state, for example its executive or legislature.
159 See, e.g., Nev. v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1979). HaIll held that California was not
required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize Nevada's sovereign immunity where
Nevada had been sued by a California citizen for damages arising out of an automobile accident in
California involving the Californian and an officer of Nevada. Id.
It may be wise policy . .. for States to accord each other immunity or to re-
spect any established limits on liability. They are free to do so. But if a fed-
eral court were to hold, by inference from the structure of our Constitution and
nothing else, that California is not free in this case to enforce its policy of full
compensation, that holding would constitute the real intrusion on the sover-
eignty of the states-and of the people-in our Union.
Id.
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ward producers, while the law of the consumers' state will be biased toward
consumers.161 The federal legal decision-maker should keep this in mind
when setting rules to govern antitrust cases in which both subsidiary states
are interested: the welfare-maximizing rule will be somewhere in between
the rules of the producer state and the consumer state.
The purpose of this hypothetical is to illustrate not a thorough analysis
of a particular problem, but rather the gist of the concerns that would face a fed-
eral legal decision-maker. In circumstances like that of the hypothetical, the
problem can be characterized as one of resolving imperfect signals. Each sub-
sidiary state has ends such that its output is an imperfect signal of the optimal
law from the perspective of the federal entity-the job of private international
law, on the nationalist view, is to resolve these signals into the law that best
attains the ends justifying federal law. In the antitrust hypothetical, a substan-
tive federal law of antitrust is not adopted because a multiplicity of state proc-
esses plus a good private international law better achieves federal ends than
would a federal substantive law; or because federal ends include the independ-
ent good of lawmaking by states: European subsidiarity. A further development
of federal nationalism would be useful in understanding and critiquing the con-
stitutional and statutory restraints imposed by the United States on the several
states under the heads of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Full Faith and
Credit.
VII. SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION
My purpose here has been to explore nationalism, not to exhaust it.
Consequently, the immediate implications of this work for legal decision-
makers are limited. Although nationalism forbids giving weight to foreign in-
terests in setting private international law, it is possible that judges' doing so is
consistent with nationalism. That would be true if judges who fail to do so have
a nationalist bias. Nationalism alone cannot be used to critique judicial opinions
on their face adopting naturalist or internationalist theories. To provide such a
critique, nationalism must be combined with empirical assertions about the bi-
ases of the relevant legal decision-makers. Nationalism alone, however, does
serve as a guide to the conscientious legal decision-maker-in many cases he
will know that his decision is not a product of a nationalist calculus, however
rough, and so he must either abandon that decision or confront the arguments for
nationalism here presented. Commentators, too, must accept nationalism or
justify their elevation of alternative normative sources as competitors of domes-
tic law.
Much room remains for further work. On the descriptive side, we do
not yet know how close state behavior comes to nationalist prescriptions; nor do
we have an adequate theory of how to shape that behavior by the application of
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market, political, and social forces and insulation to conform to nationalist pre-
scriptions. The questions here carry a close resemblance to those animating the
modem corporate-law literature. The two fields have much to learn from each
other: private international law can absorb the relatively advanced agency-cost
analysis that has developed in corporate law, while corporate law can absorb the
respect for nonmarket forces that is difficult to avoid in private international
law. The strong resemblance nationalism bears to Professor Coase's theory of
the firm is one example of the likely interconnections.
Nationalism itself can profitably be extended to a theory of the optimal
technology of private international law-under what circumstances fine-grained
claims to sovereignty are useful; to a theory of the ways and incidence of cam-
ouflaging sovereignty-of reducing imposed costs of sovereignty without cut-
ting back on sovereignty; and to a theory of the regulatory-scope decisions made
by officers of nonstate institutions and the possible origin of tastes for interna-
tionalist constraints in familiarity with the situation of such officers. Finally,
nationalism can be applied from the perspective of a federal entity resolving
internal regulatory conflicts. In the United States, for example, the constitu-
tional and statutory law surrounding the Commerce, Due Process, Equal Protec-
tion, and Full Faith and Credit clauses as they apply to choice of law, jurisdic-
tion, enforcement of judgments, and other responses to interstate claims to sov-
ereignty, is subject to nationalist critique.
2005]
57
Camara: Costs of Sovereignty
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
58
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss2/5
